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ABSTRACT
Malingering is a frequently encountered problem of faking psychological or
physiological symptoms or exaggerating existing conditions for external gain.
Malingerers typically are seen in clinical and forensic settings and create a burden to our
society due to loss of economic resources or professional time. The impact of
malingering is difficult to calculate due to problems with identifying actual cases of
malingering. Psychological tests traditionally have been used in the assessment of
malingering. Despite major improvements in instruments and clinical interviewing
techniques, however, no failsafe assessment tool has been identified for the accurate
detection of malingering. Cognitive studies of lie detection have provided evidence that
liars differ from truth-tellers in terms of increased cognitive load that might be measured
via several cognitive cues. For example, response time is longer for liars compared to
truth-tellers. Eye gaze and pupil dilation also differ when individuals lie. TRI-Con is a
new approach (officially introduced by Walczyk, 2005) that uses eye data to monitor,
record, and compare truthful versus deceptive responses and might be a stepping stone to
more accurate and objective detection of malingering in the future. The current study was
designed to reveal differences between truth-tellers and malingerers in terms of response
time and eye data when confronted with different scenarios that entail telling the truth,
rehearsed malingering, and unrehearsed malingering. Findings showed that response time
is a more reliable cue for detecting malingering than eye data.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The American Psychological Association (APA, 2007) defines malingering as
"the deliberate feigning of an illness or disability to achieve a particular desired outcome
(e.g., financial gain or escaping responsibility, punishment, imprisonment, or military
duty)" (p. 551). Malingerers may pretend to suffer from physical or psychological
problems or significantly exaggerate existing symptoms to achieve their goals. Under rare
circumstances, malingering might constitute an adaptive function such as avoiding
captivity during war or hostage situations (APA, 2000). In most circumstances, however,
malingering represents a socially negative event characterized by deceit, fraud, or lying.
This phenomenon is neither a psychiatric nor a medical disorder; it is categorized as a Vcode in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Edition) Text
Revision (DSM-IV-TR; APA). The APA suggests that malingering often involves: (a)
medical and legal issues; (b) objective clinical findings that differ significantly from the
individual's reported problems; (c) a lack of cooperation during the evaluation process or
failure to comply with the prescribed treatment; and (d) antisocial personality disorder.
Malingering might initially be confused with factitious disorder, a psychological
disorder based on the purposeful fabrication of psychological or physical symptoms.
Individuals with this diagnosis, however, make up symptoms in order to assume the sick
role and not for the gain or escape sought by malingerers. There are four subtypes:
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(a) with predominantly psychological signs and symptoms such as depression or
hallucinations; (b) with predominantly physical signs and symptoms such as pretending
to suffer from pain; (c) with combined psychological and physical signs and symptoms
such as grief and headaches after the unconfirmed death of a spouse; and (d) factitious
disorder not otherwise specified, a subtype that does not meet the criteria for any of the
other subtypes. Munchhausen Syndrome is considered the most severe and chronic form
of factitious disorder and often manifests itself in repeated hospitalizations (APA, 2007).
The motivation differs between malingering and factitious disorder. Whereas people with
factitious disorder are rewarded by adopting the sick role itself, malingerers are
motivated by external factors such as financial gain, the avoidance of duties and
responsibilities, or obtaining treatment or drugs that are not medically justified. The
hallmark of a diagnosis of malingering is that the symptoms or deficits are intentionally
created for some type of external gain (APA, 2000).
Malingering historically has been categorized as a disease by psychoanalytic
theorists. However, research has not supported its pathogenic nature because of the lack
of evidence supporting either conscious motivation or unconscious defense mechanisms
(Lo Piccolo, Goodkin, & Baldewicz, 1999; Resnick, 1999; Singh, Avasthi, & Grover,
2007). Malingering is not considered a psychological disorder because it involves the
purposeful deceiving of others for external rewards. It drains society of financial
resources, falsely engages professional services, and causes a lack of productivity from
the malingerer. For these reasons, it is not considered a mental disorder in and of itself,
but rather a deliberate act of faking emotional, physical, or psychological distress in order
to obtain otherwise inaccessible resources. For example, Lees-Haley (1997) reports a

20% to 30% base rate for malingering in his United States sample of plaintiffs claiming
personal injury. The American Board of Clinical Neuropsychologists estimates that 29%
of the plaintiffs in personal injury cases are malingering (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock,
& Condit, 2002).
Singh and colleagues (2007) distinguish among various categories of malingering:
(a) pure; (b) partial; (c) positive; and (d) negative. Producing non-existent symptoms is
considered pure malingering, whereas exaggeration of already existing indicators is a
partial form of malingering. For example, a person without psychotic problems who
claims to experience auditory hallucinations is producing non-existing symptoms (pure
malingering), whereas a mildly depressed person who reports tremendous distress,
sadness, hopelessness, and even suicidal ideations would exemplify symptom
exaggeration (partial malingering). Feigning the signs of a disorder is consistent with the
positive form of malingering, whereas concealing or misrepresenting signs is the negative
form. Other types of malingering include the alteration of data and the staging of certain
situations that later could be interpreted as an accident. For example, an individual might
alter a physician's health report so that the data portray him as less healthy than he is in
reality. Another malingerer might plant the proverbial banana peal in a store in order to
conveniently slip on it, pretend to have been hurt due to the negligence of the store, and
pursue a legal settlement for financial gain.
Samuel and Mittenberg (2005) suggest that the following factors indicate the
presence of malingering: (a) atypical or exaggerated symptoms; (b) inconsistencies in
symptom description; (c) activities and behaviors that contradict claims; and (d) claims
that are motivated by and have circumstances other than sickness or disability. These
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same authors suggest that the following factors are inconsistent with malingering:
(a) obtaining aggressive treatment such as painful interventions; (b) objective collateral
corroboration; (c) losses that are significant and obvious to the observer; and
(d) self-defeating actions and behaviors. Taken together, these two sets of factors are
important considerations when assessing an individual for malingering.
Statement of the Problem
Estimates of the incidence of malingering within the realm of psychology suggest
that approximately 1% of civilian and 5% of military clients fake mental illness (Singh et
al., 2007). Singh and colleagues further report rates of malingering personal injury cases
ranging from 1% to 50%. Combined legal and medical cases suggest rates from 10% to
20%. According to Mischoulon (1999), psychiatric disability is estimated to cost $12
billion annually in the U.S., an estimate that has increased significantly over the past
decade. Various government and privately financed programs have been established for
providing payments for medical and psychiatric problems or disability, including:
(a) Emergency Aid; (b) Worker's Compensation; (c) Department of Veterans' Affairs,
(d) Private Insurance Companies; (e) Social Security Administration; (f) Medicare; and
(g) Medicaid. All of these organizations are negatively affected by people faking their
disorders and making illegitimate financial claims.
Research suggests that all age groups are involved in malingering (Singh et al.,
2007). These disorders range from mental retardation to psychosis. Getting benefits for
disabilities, claiming unjustified compensations, and retaliating against employers are
some of the reasons for mental health malingering, according to these authors.
Malingering creates a variety of problems for the medical, psychiatric, and psychological
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professions that are challenged with correctly diagnosing the existence of mental and
physical disease and disorder. Malingering also hurts the economy. Malingerers might
target the acquisition of one-time financial compensations such as litigation suits, or they
might seek financial benefits such as those which accompany disability status. Samuel
and Mittenberg (2005), for example, estimate that 7.5% to 33% of individuals who claim
disability status are malingerers.
The legal system is plagued by many types of malingering: in order to avoid
punishment via an insanity plea; assuming incompetency to stand trial; or introducing
unjustified litigation and personal injury litigation. This form of deception also burdens
the correctional system with inmates who fake mental or physical illnesses (Boone,
Savodnik, Ghafferian, Lee, & Freeman, 1995; Pollack & Grainey, 1984; Rubenzer,
2004).
In sum, malingering represents a burden to the medical and psychological
professions, insurance and disability services, governmental systems that grant financial
benefits, and to society in general (Pollack & Grainey, 1984). It drains our society of
limited resources by providing benefits to people who would not receive them if their
false claims were detectable.
Justification
The existence of malingering unfairly draws on resources of those legitimately
suffering from various disorders. Moreover, some people who are actually ill might avoid
seeking disability or treatment out of fear of being labeled a malingerer. Traditionally, the
mental health profession is reluctant to identify malingerers, possibly due to legal
concerns and also because of the ethical concern of violating confidences protected by
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the therapeutic relationship (Resnick, 1984). However, increased competition for limited
resources and general awareness of mental and medical symptoms trigger the need to
differentiate accurately between real and fraudulent need for services (Singh et al., 2007).
It is increasingly easy for someone to fake any type of medical or psychological disorder
with the availability of information from the Internet and other resources. For example,
concerns have been expressed that attorneys might coach their clients on tests designed to
detect malingering and this undermines the test's validity (Rogers, 1997; Wetter
& Corrigan, 1995; Youngjohn, 1995). Clients also look up professional articles about
disorders in libraries, read professional medical journals, and obtain internet information
on exact symptomalogy (Rogers, 1997; Wetter & Corrigan, 1995; Youngjohn, 1995).
Accurate assessments of malingering are needed that can better safeguard the fair
distribution of resources. The creation of a more reliable system for disability evaluators
to detect feigned claims would help burdened professionals focus on processing
legitimate applications more efficiently.

Literature Review
Although the importance of accurately identifying malingering seems obvious, the
precise detection of this form of deception is an ongoing challenge for the medical,
psychiatric, and psychological professions. It frequently involves significant differences
between clinical findings and reported symptoms (Cunnien, 1997; Singh et al., 2007).
Singh and colleagues (2007) suggest taking certain steps in order to increase accuracy of
the recognition of feigned symptoms. Conducting a thorough clinical history by
interviewing the patient, asking leading questions in order to test for responses, and
conducting elaborate cross examinations for suspected malingerers are some of their

7

suggestions for differentiating between feigned and true illness. Observations of the client
during the interview situation in order to detect verbal, facial, and behavioral cues, and an
emphasis on continuing observation across time and different settings are additional
suggestions of theirs. Reliance on observed cues, however, is problematic because of a
heretofore high rate of misinterpretation of them.
Settings of Malingering
Malingerers fake distress, sickness, and injuries with various dishonest goals in
mind. Two of the main settings in which malingering of physical or psychological
problems occur are forensic settings and in claims for financial gain such as gaining
disability status, workers' compensation, or during litigation. For financial damages
settlement, individuals frequently fake psychological disorders because they are often
difficult to detect due to the absence of tangible symptoms of such disorders.
Ziskin (1984) notes that evaluating patients for malingering is approached
differently from the clinical and forensic perspective. There often is less incentive to
malinger in the classical clinical setting than in forensic settings where faking symptoms
or exaggerating existing conditions might constitute a major advantage. Fauteck (1995)
reports that malingered psychosis is an especially frequent preference of defendants, a
phenomenon that burdens the court with redundant assessments and costs the forensic
system valuable time and money. Pollock (1998) interviewed three groups of prison
inmates, those who were: (a) genuinely psychotic; (b) simulating a psychotic disorder; or
(c) previously psychotic but currently faking psychosis. Findings from this study revealed
that both simulators and inmates with a history of psychosis but presently without
manifest psychiatric problems produced reports with simple and concise descriptions of
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their malingered symptoms. Members of these groups also reported severe impairments
due to their mental problems, and their reports appeared distressful and believable.
Pollock states that challenging the truthfulness of psychosis is problematic for mental
health professionals because they might be accused of increasing the distress of inmates.
Despite minimal improvements in clinical interviewing and psychological measurements
of malingering, the lack of a foolproof method for detecting deception remains a problem
for the mental health professional in this setting (Fauteck, 1995).
Not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), guilty but mentally ill (GBMI), and
incompetency to stand trial are three court rulings that often are pursued by an able
person who is trying to avoid punishment or change an expected sentence of
incarceration to psychiatric treatment (Krings, Davison, Neale, & Johnson, 2007).
Rubenzer (2004) notes that one major concern with malingerers in forensic settings is
their taking advantage of society's compassion for true mental health patients. Such
deceptions often produce subsequent distrust toward defendants who are actually
incompetent or insane. Other problems that malingerers create within this context are the
enormous financial burden and the drainage of resources such as psychological and
psychiatric treatments and legal fees. Malingerers in prison often are bored with the
sterile environment of correctional psychiatric wards, and they require mental health
services by behaviorally acting out. Rubenzer elaborates on the Supreme Court decision
to prohibit the execution of mentally retarded inmates. This might constitute an enormous
incentive, he states, for some criminals to fake cognitive impairments or other mental
problems. He further states that mental health professionals in forensic settings report
malingering rates of 16% to 18% by individuals who claim significant impairments.
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Rubenzer cautions that this range is probably an underestimate, because many
malingerers are not accurately identified. Whereas many prison inmates malinger, others
are severely mentally ill, often undiagnosed, and in need of treatment (Teplin, 1990).
There are major concerns with prisoners who have secondary motivations for
claiming mental health problems (Resnick, 1997; Rogers, Ustad, & Salekin, 1997).
Inmates frequently malinger for various gain motives and burden the prison mental health
system with unjustified claims that complicate diagnosis (Wang, Rogers, Giles, Diamond,
Herrington-Wang, & Taylor, 1997). For example, a fake diagnosis of mental or medical
illnesses might have an impact on their work assignments or provide them with
medications which they can trade for cigarettes or other items. According to the
American Psychiatric Association (2000), antisocial personality disorder is one major
DSM diagnosis that is associated with malingering in correctional populations.
There is no accurate information regarding the rates of malingering for financial
compensation, only estimates. The difficulty is because objective detection of
malingering still does not exist (Samuel & Mittenberg, 2005). Sumanti, Boone, Savodnik
and Gorsuch (2006) observed that approximately 9% to 29% of a sample of workers who
applied for stress related workers' compensation displayed non-credible psychiatric
symptoms. More than two decades ago, Marcus (1983) and Lasky (1980) described the
work-related claims of psychological stress, and this figure has not declined (Sumanti,
Boone, Savodnik, & Gorsuch, 2006). For example, stress related claims associated with
employment rose by 700% between 1979 and 1988 and each claim costs an average of
$12,000 (California Worker's Compensation Institute, 1990). Due to the insidious nature
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of malingering, the actual extent of financial burden on the economy can only be grossly
estimated.
Diagnosing Malingering
Research over the past three decades has shown the lack of reliable tools for
detecting deception. According to Vrij (2008), even experts in lie detection such as police
officers are no more successful than the average individual whose accurate identification
of liars via observation of behavioral cues ranges from 45% to 60%. A meta-analysis of
108 studies about detecting deception confirmed this finding, and Aamodt and Custer
(2006) reported that neither confidence, experience, education, nor sex of examiner was
significantly related to accurate identification of deception. Even professionals in the
field of lie detection (e.g., police, detectives, and judges) showed the same ability to
detect faking as students and other individuals not professionally trained in this field
(Aamodt & Custer).
Different explanations exist about the difficulties inherent in lie detection.
O'Sullivan (2003) focused on examiners' thought processes which impact their ability to
identify liars correctly. For example, cognitive heuristics, especially the fundamental
attribution error (FAE), might provide an explanation for this human fallability. The FAE
represents people's tendency to overestimate the relevance of personal traits such as
aggressiveness or attentiveness when they form opinions of others (Ross & Nisbett,
1991). O'Sullivan found that individuals with better lie detection abilities are better able
to separate their judgments of state and trait honesty compared to people without good
lie-detection abilities. Trait judgments are opinions formed about another individual's
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personality characteristics or traits, whereas state judgments involve looking at the
context in which a behavior takes place.
Other explanations for the inability to accurately identify liars include the
following: problems with attending sufficiently to non-verbal behaviors when judging the
veracity of others' statements (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, & Scherer, 1980; Ekman,
O'Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991); more orientation to speech content instead of
observing paralinguistic cues (DePaulo, Rosenthal, Rosenkrantz, & Green, 1982;
O'Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1985); a tendency to judge others as truthful or
deceptive (O'Sullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988; Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance,
& Rosenthal, 1979; Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984); and having incorrect
schematas about cues to deception. Deceptive cues include the belief that people who
avoid eye gazes are lying, whereas research indicates that liars increase eye gaze during
deception due to their awareness of this paradigm (Zuckerman & Driver, 1985; Ekman
& Friesen, 1969). Deviations from physical, personality, cultural, and behavioral norms
are frequently interpreted as cues to deception. For example, people who have awkward
physical characteristics or who display mannerisms which are outside of what is
considered normal within one's culture are frequently viewed as suspicious, and their
truthfulness is questioned (Bond, Omar, Mahmoud, & Bonser, 1990; Bond, Omar, Pitre,
& Lashley, 1992; Ekman, 2001; Riggio, Salinas, & Tucker, 1988; Zebrowitz, Voinescu,
& Collins, 1996).
There are no known mechanisms for identifying liars and malingerers by merely
observing behaviors. Therefore, more reliable measures are necessary in order to improve
the detection of deception in general and malingering in particular.
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Psychological Tests
Psychological tests traditionally have been used for detecting malingering.
Although no failsafe instrument has been identified at this time, the inclusion of testing
has been considered a valuable adjunct methodology in detecting malingering. Research
on detecting malingering via psychological measures has shown that testing has produced
both false positives and false negatives. The American Psychological Association (2007)
defines false positives as "a case that is incorrectly included in a group by the test used to
determine inclusion" (p. 366) and false negatives as "a case that is incorrectly excluded
from the group by the test used to determine inclusion" (p. 366). In the case of a
malingering diagnosis, a false positive would consist of incorrectly labeling a sick
individual as a malingerer. Incorrectly labeling a person faking symptoms as being
"sick," on the other hand, would comprise a false negative. Increased public knowledge
of psychological and medical symptomology supports more sophisticated ways of faking
and also coaching for malingering, and both of these have made correct detection and
malingering increasingly difficult (Leng & Parkin, 1995; Singh et al., 2007).
Psychological instruments that are commonly used for detecting malingering are
reviewed below.
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) is 567-item
personality measure frequently is used to assess clinical psychopathology, including
clients' testing attitude and their attempts to exaggerate symptoms and was originally
developed by Hathaway and McKinley (1940). The MMPI-2 is the most frequently used
test for the assessment of psychopathology, especially for evaluations within the context
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of forensic examinations and the review of disability claims (Bagby, Marshall,
& Bacchiochi, 2005). Besides the clinical scales and subscales, the ten validity scales of
the MMPI-2 play a significant role in its popularity within these contexts. These ten
scales are a sophisticated way to measure whether or not a test profile is valid. Invalid
test profiles might be produced by random answering and/or poor reading abilities of
examinees. The validity scales also provide indications of test-taker motivation, for
example, the tendency to conceal, disclose, or emphasize problems (Groth-Marnat,
2003). The F-scales (F, F-Back, and Infrequency-Psychopathology) are called the
malingering scales because they measure the presence of symptoms that are indicative of
severe psychiatric illness.
Friedman, Lewak, Nicols, and Webb (2001) note that the F-scale of the MMPI-2
is intended to assess examinees' tendencies to respond to the 60 test items which
comprise the F-Scale in an uncommon manner. For example, individuals who do not
understand the questions might obtain high scores on this scale. The same high scores,
however, might be achieved by someone with situational distress who has poor reading
comprehension of the items, who experiences genuine psychological problems, or who
tries to exaggerate or fake problems. This scale represents one of the most sensitive
scales of the MMPI-2 for suggesting severity of distress.
The F-Back scale (FB) was designed for a similar purpose. Its items fall in the last
half of the MMPI-2. Whereas the F-scale is designed to detect psychoticism, the FB scale
is designed mainly to detect distress and depression. This subscale is also important in the
detection of random responding and malingering (Wetter, Baer, Berry, Smith, & Larsen,
1992). Wetter and collegues found that the F B scale is effective in detecting random
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responding and also the feigning of mild, moderate, and severe disturbance. Malingering
severe psychopathology produces the highest scores on the FB scale. Clinicians are
encouraged to interpret high scores on this scale with caution, however, because there are
other explanations for high scores such as fatigue or uncooperativeness.
The Infrequency-Psychopathology (Fp) scale was created to assess the tendency to
over-report symptoms or to portray oneself in an unfavorable light. This subscale is
sensitive to the exaggeration of problems, especially the exaggeration of psychotic
symptoms. Combined with the use of all three F-scales, good clinical judgment is the
critical component needed to assess malingering (Friedman et al., 2001).
An important constellation of the MMPI-2 validity scales frequently is used for
detecting malingering. An inverted "V" constellation of the validity scales (low Lie [L])
scale, high F-scale, and low Correction scale) suggest that the test taker attempted to fake
mental illness (Singh et al., 2007). Friedman and colleagues (2001) describe the L-scale
as a 15-item subscale designed to detect underreporting of symptoms, e.g., "faking
good." For example, child custody cases or employment testing are settings in which
individuals may be prone to portray themselves in a favorable light. All 15 items may be
scored in the false direction in these cases. For example, "I do not always tell the truth"
or "I get angry sometimes" are two examples of questions that assess "faking good." The
values portrayed by these two items might be highly desirable for the majority of
individuals, but they rarely are achieved, and a "true" endorsement is the most truthful
answer for most people. Caution in interpretation is warranted, however, because this
scale is affected by moderator variables such as socio-economic status, education, and
occupation.
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The Correction (K) scale originally was intended to improve the sensitivity of the
clinical subscales in identifying psychological problems. It adds a correction or
suppressor element to the obtained scaled scores on the clinical scales. The purpose of
this factor is to decrease false positives or low scores endorsed by psychiatric populations
who would be expected to achieve elevations on certain clinical scales. Several issues
must be considered before interpreting K-scale scores. For example, certain personality
traits are closely related to the willingness to report and admit to shortcomings and
problems. In these instances, an incorrect diagnosis of malingering (false positive) might
occur. Clearly, scores on all of these validity scales are ambiguous at best for uncovering
malingering.
In a meta-analysis of studies designed to detect malingering with the MMPI-2,
Rogers, Sewell, Martin, and Vitacco (2003) found that research participants who were
instructed to feign mental illness scored significantly differently from actual psychiatric
patients on the F, FB, and F-Infrequency-Psychopathology (Fp) scales. The analysis
produced large between-group effect sizes which suggested that the validity scales
discussed above provide a valuable tool for detecting feigned mental illness. However,
Friedman and colleagues (2001) caution that whereas the L and F scales display adequate
properties in the detection of extreme test-taking attitudes or misrepresentations, they
show a lower level of precision with subtle levels of defensiveness and underreporting of
difficulties.
The MMPI-2 is, thus, not failsafe for the accurate detection of malingering.
Elevated F-scales do not automatically indicate a motivation to deceive, because they
may indicate the presence of clinical depression in psychiatric populations (Steffan,
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Clopton, & Morgan, 2003). Due to the high prevalence of depression in the population
- a lifetime risk ranging from 5 % to 25 % depending on sex (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) - the inability to differentiate between depression and faking
depression is problematic for clinical practice. Therefore, Steffan and colleagues (2003)
created the Malingering Depression Scale (Md) on the MMPI-2 to identify malingerer
depression. It consists of 32 items that appear to increase valid differentiation of
malingering by sophisticated feigners and by naive feigners from actual depressed
students (Bagby, Marshall, & Bacchiochi, 2005; Steffan et al., 2003).
Personality Assessment Inventory
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991) is another personality
inventory used to measure adult psychopathology that has application in the detection of
malingering (Sumanti et al., 2006; Wang et al., 1997). This instrument consists of 344
test items that are scored on a 4-point Likert scale. The purpose of the PAI is to screen for
mental health problems and to facilitate clinical diagnosis and treatment planning
(Morey, 1991). The negative impression management (NIM) and malingering index (MI)
scales on this instrument typically are used to identify malingerers. The NIM scale is a
validity scale that can detect the feigning of specific disorders (Calhoun, Earnst, Tucker,
Kirby, & Beckham, 2000). Hopwood, Morey, Rogers, and Sewell (2007) report that
individuals who display specific distortions on the NIM and on certain clinical subscales
on the PAI are more likely to feign major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, or schizophrenia. Calhoun and colleagues (2000) report less efficacy of these
scales to identify feigned depression, with a hit rate of 55.9%, and generalized anxiety
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disorder, with a hit rate of 38.7%. They report that malingered schizophrenia was
detected in 90.9% of the researched cases.
Sumanti and colleagues (2006) found low levels of correct identification of
malingerers with the two PAI validity scales (MIN and MAL). When scores on these
scales are correlated with scores on other cognitive measures such as the Dot Counting
test and Rey test, the correlations were exceedingly low, ranging from non-existent to
moderate. This suggests a weak relationship between symptoms for psychiatric
malingering and cognitive effort tests, and it confirms findings from earlier studies that
psychiatric malingering is independent from faking cognitive impairment (Boone,
Savodnik, Ghaffarian, Lee, & Freeman, 1995, as cited in Sumanti et al., 2006). Liljequist,
Kinder, and Schinka (1998) showed that in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
simulation studies, undergraduate students in the malingering experimental condition
scored higher than participant ts it the control condition on the NIM and malingering
index (MI). Therefore, the PAI seems to be effective in identifying PTSD in simulation
research. Whereas the NIM scale is highly effective in detecting PTSD malingering in
instructed simulation, it appears to misclassify individuals who actually suffer from
PTSD. In other words, it yields false positives. Scores of PTSD sufferers on this scale
suggest that they significantly over-report their symptoms, and for this reason, 13% to
26% of individuals with PTSD could be classified as malingerers (Calhoun et al., 2000).
Morey (1991) found a correlation of .54 between the MMPI-2's F-Scale and the
PAI's NIM scale. Calhoun and colleagues (2000) caution therapists to consider the
setting when assessing the probability of making a Type I or Type II error regarding
diagnosis of PTSD with the PAI validity indexes. A Type I or alpha error occurs when
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researchers reject a null Hypothesis that is true, whereas a Type II or beta error occurs
when a false null Hypotheses is not rejected (American Psychological Association,
2007). Whereas liberal criteria for PTSD may be better suited for settings which provide
critical treatments, more stringent criteria should be applied to court settings. For this
reason, a NEM score greater than 8 is suggested in forensic settings.
Another important aspect of deception research is the impact of coaching. Bagby,
Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder, and Bury (2002) found that coaching did not increase
effectiveness in malingering when research participants were assessed with the MMPI-2
and the PAL This means that coaching malingerers on the symptomology of their
reported disorders does not make them better fakers when assessed by the MMPI-2 and
PAL Guriel-Tennant and Fremouw (2006) report that coached participants in a PTSD
study had lower group means than uncoached malingerers on the NIM and MI scales of
the PAL No significant difference was noted between detection of malingerers in each
group.
Research in which participants simulated suffering from symptoms of
schizophrenia, major depression, or generalized anxiety disorder revealed findings that
the PAI's effectiveness in detecting malingering depends on the level of sophistication of
the malingerer. Specifically, Rogers, Sewell, Morey, and Ustad (1996) found that the PAI
is moderately effective in detecting unrehearsed simulators and also moderately effective
in identifying rehearsed simulators. This suggests that extensive preparation in studying
symptoms of psychotic, mood, or anxiety disorders can help malingerers to escape
detection when tested with the PAI.
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Rorschach Inkblot Test
The Rorschach is a projective test consisting of a set of cards with ten bilaterally
symmetrical black-and-white or colored inkblots. Its original version was developed in
1921 by Swiss psychiatrist, Hermann Rorschach (Rorschach, 1964). The test format was
based on the assumption that individuals have specific needs, motivations, conflicts, and
individualistic ways of perceiving their environment (Groth-Marnat, 2003). The
examinee is asked "What might this be?" or "What do you see in this?" when presented
with each card (p. 808). Response content of responses is classified according to different
structural and thematic elements such as color and movement (APA, 2007). Although
frequently criticized, the Rorschach appears to maintain its status in the psychological
profession as evidenced by the multitude of publications, books, and ongoing research
involving this test (Archer & Newsom, 2000; Camara, Nathan, & Puente, 2000; Exner,
1997). Interpretation of the Rorschach is based on the assumption that the way people
organize their responses during the test is representative of their dealings with ambiguous
situations that also demand organization and judgment (Groth-Marnat, 2003). Therefore,
this test is believed to provide insight into unconscious motivations and attitudes.
Another application of the Rorschach is in the detection of malingering. In testing
the ability to fake psychosis on the Rorschach test, Ganellen, Wasyliw, Haywood, and
Grossman (1996) found that the combination of Rorschach and MMPI-2 provide
effective criteria for identifying deliberate faking of psychosis. However, other research
findings regarding the Rorschach are problematic if the researcher fails to use a formal
scoring system (Albert, Fox, & Kahn, 1980, as cited in Ganellen et al., 1996) such as
Exner's Rorschach Comprehensive System (1991).
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In another study of the detection of malingering, Meisner (1988) studied the
impact of faked depression on scores from the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the
MMPI Depression Scale, and the Rorschach. The undergraduate student participants were
instructed to feel depressed, informed about the symptoms of depression, and offered a
$50 cash reward for the most convincing malingering on the assessment. The findings
suggest that malingered depression can be identified by the Rorschach Morbid Special
(MSS) and Blood (Bl) scores for example. Interestingly, Intelligence did not have an
effect on participants' ability to alter their responses. Meisner suggests that atypical
frequencies in response determinants should not serve as evidence for malingering.
Furthermore, Meisner (1988) found that the content indicators of depression on the
Rorschach are influenced by examinees' impression management strategies, e.g., their
motivation to appear depressed. Whereas in Meisner's research such motivation was
demonstrated by participants who had been coached about symptoms of depression, other
studies revealed that uncoached participants displayed similar scores (Feldman & Graley,
1954; Seamons, Howell, Carlisle, & Roe, 1981).
Rey Memory Test (RMT) and Rey II
The Rey Memory Test (Rey, 1964) is a brief, 15-item instrument created for the
detection of memory impairment. The original test was developed by the French
neurologist, Andre Rey, as an assessment of memory impairments. The 15 items are
arrayed in three columns and five rows on a card. The items include simple geometric
designs or single-digit numbers. The test taker must reproduce these items after the card
has been shown for 10 seconds and is then removed (Griffin, Glassmire, Aubrey,
Henderson, & McCann, 1997). In order for memory tests to work in the detection of
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malingering, the malingerer must perceive the test as difficult for people with cognitive
impairments. This will trigger the individual's tendency to underperform (Bolan, Foster,
Schmand, & Bolan, 2002).
Simon (1994) found in forensic clinical settings that the Rey Memory Test can
effectively discriminate between malingerers and controls. However, the cut-off score
appears to be a crucial component when assessing for malingering. Whereas a low cut-off
score of 3 items remembered results in a false positive rate of 57% in the control group, a
cut-off score of 9 creates an improved differentiation between malingerers and
non-malingerers. The cut-off score appears to be an important component in detecting
memory malingering, but researchers vary in their determination of an appropriate one.
Most frequently a score of 8 or 9 is suggested for improved accuracy (Bernard & Fowler,
1990; Goldberg & Millar, 1986; Kelly, Baker, van den Broek, Jackson & Humphries,
2005). Five case studies by Taylor, Kreutzer, and West (2003) with the Rey 15-item Test
(FIT) and other standardized neurobehavioral and neuropsychological measures with
outpatients showed that severely brain-damaged individuals obtained perfect scores on
the FIT. The authors, therefore, support the use of high cut-off scores for identifying
malingering. Malingerers score significantly lower than individuals with severe cognitive
impairments.
The Rey II is a redesign of the original Rey 15-item Visual Memory Test (1964),
and it demonstrates a significant improvement in the detection of malingering. The
format of the Rey II is similar to the original Rey (three columns and five rows of simple
items), but some of the items have been altered so that its difficulty level is slightly
increased (Griffin et al., 1997). The instrument uses a qualitative scoring system with
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improved effectiveness for detecting malingering over the quantitative system of its
predecessor. Whereas the quantitative scoring system exhibited average sensitivity
(ability to identify malingerers with 39% accuracy) and average specificity (ability to
identify optimal performers with 73% accuracy), the qualitative system has an average
sensitivity of 73% and specificity of 86%. Examining the nature of the qualitative errors
helps to improve the detection of malingering over the original version of the Rey
(Griffin et al., 1997).
Further research on malingering with the Rey AVLT used the serial position
effect (SPE) for distinguishing between uncoached malingerers, coached malingerers,
and individuals with actual illness (Powell, Geller, Oliveri, Stanton, & Hendricks, 2004).
The American Psychological Association (2007) defines the SPE as "the effect of an
item's position in a list of items to be learned on how well it is remembered" (p. 841).
Individuals are more likely to remember the first items (the primacy effect) and the last
items (the recency effect), whereas items in the middle of the list are more likely to be
forgotten. Powell and colleagues divided research participants into four groups:
(a) normal controls; (b) simulators who were coached on symptoms; (c) simulators who
were coached on taking the test; and (d) individuals with actual moderate to severe
subacute traumatic brain injury (TBI). Whereas the normal control group and the actual
TBI patients demonstrated the expected SPE, the simulators suppressed the primacy
effect. Unfortunately, the SPE does not seem to be sensitive or specific enough by itself
to be used in the detection of malingering. Other assessments are necessary to create a
more valid differentiation between malingerers and truth-tellers. Individuals with
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sophisticated styles of exaggeration appear to be especially able to challenge Rey AVLT
and its method of assessment.
Boone and colleagues (1995) correlated scores on brief cognitive instruments with
personality measures, e.g., Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI; Millon, 1996).
Individuals with failing scores on cognitive malingering tests, such as the Rey
Memorization and Dot Counting, obtained scores on personality inventories that
suggested personality disorders and psychotic features. The group who scored poorly on
the cognitive measures displayed elevated scores on personality test scales that indicated
avoidance, dependence, passive-aggressiveness, anxiety, somatoform disorder, and
dysthymia. These results might be interpreted either as showing a relationship between
certain personality traits and cognitive malingering performance, or as showing an
artificial elevation due to exaggeration or feigning of psychological problems. Additional
analyses compared two groups of participants who failed the cognitive malingering
instruments: one group had valid, non-exaggerated scores on the MCMI whereas the
other group displayed faked/exaggerated scores. This difference indicated that the second
interpretation is feigning or exaggeration problems (Boone, et al., 1995).
Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM)
In many ways, American society rewards sickness by providing resources to the
ill such as disability payments, but then withdraw support such as financial aid when the
previously sick individuals improve. Therefore, multiple incentives exist for pretending
to be sick. Constantitiou and McCaffrey (2003) observed that, mental health
professionals express concerns about the low level of motivation and effort when clients
take a neuropsychological test. Neuropsychologists have worked on developing
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assessments to detect suboptimal efforts so that invalid test scores and incorrect
diagnoses can be reduced. The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996)
is a frequently used test, because it is designed to identify less than optimal performance
due to low motivation or lack of effort on neuropsychological tests. The test contains 50
line-drawn stimulus pictures and foil pictures. Two trials typically are run with pictures
shown out of sequence on the second trial. Constantitiou and McCaffrey found that the
TOMM is more effective than the Rey 15-item test at identifying children who put forth
suboptimal efforts during neuropsychological evaluations. Adequate sensitivity and
specificity also was noted in samples of adult TBI patients and individuals who were
seeking compensation for mild head traumas (Haber & Fichtenberg, 2006).
O'Bryant, Engel, Kleiner, Vasterling, and Black (2007) identify Trial 1 of the
TOMM as a brief screening instrument with high diagnostic accuracy when assessing
clients demonstrating suboptimal effort. However, the researchers also suggest that
additional studies are needed to assess application within clinical and forensic contexts.
O'Bryant and Lucas (2006) found that the TOMM is not highly sensitive but very
specific when identifying malingerers. Test sensitivity refers to the proportion of
individuals with a certain condition that will be identified by the instrument, also known
as "true positives." Specificity describes the proportion of people without the condition
who are identified correctly by the measurement, also known as "true negatives." This
means that the TOMM is more effective in identifying people who do not have the
condition. The test was found to have a very high positive predictive value of .98 and a
satisfying negative predictive value of .78. These findings make the test a valuable tool in
the detection of faking memory problems. One limitation of this study was the use of
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only one other memory test (Word Memory Test) for establishing reliability and validity
of the TOMM. O'Bryant and Lucas (2006) caution that multiple methods for assessing
malingering are essential for correctly identifying it.
Bolan, Foster, Schmand, and Bolan (2002) found that response latency is an
important indicator for identifying malingerers on neuropsychological instruments such
as the Amsterdam Short Memory Test (ASTM; Schagen, Schmand, de Sterke,
& Lindeboom, 1997) and the TOMM. Simulated malingerers display significantly higher
response times on these instruments compared to truth-tellers. This supports the value of
using response time when developing methods for detecting malingering.
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms
The Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Gillis, Dickens,
& Bagby, 1991) consists of 172 items which are answered in a true-false format. It is
designed to measure deliberate distortions of psychological functioning (Heinze, 2003)
and is one of the few direct measures of malingering. The SIRS has eight primary scales,
three of which measure the frequency of symptom endorsement: (a) Blatant Symptoms
Scale (BL), (b) Subtle Symptoms Scale (SU), and (c) Selectivity of Symptoms Scale
(SEL). An individual's tendency to endorse unusual symptoms is assessed by the
following four scales: (a) Rare Symptom Scale (RS), (b) Improbable and Absurd
Symptoms Scale (IA), (c) Atypical Symptom Combinations Scale (SC), and (d) Extreme
Severity of Symptoms Scale (SEV). Additionally, the Reported vs. Observed Symptoms
Scales (RO) assess to what extent symptoms are endorsed during the interview process.
Moderate elevations suggest possible feigning, whereas marked elevations indicate
definite malingering (Heinze, 2003).
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Heinze (2003) reported that the SIRS was effective in detecting malingering of
psychosis. Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, and Munizza (2007) also examined its effectiveness
in detecting faked mental illness, and they identified the SIRS as a robust instrument for
assessment of forensic competency to stand trial.
In summary, the tests reviewed above are some of the more frequently used
instruments for uncovering malingering. However, a large number of unreviewed tests
exist that are used in forensic and clinical settings and also in research. Lally (2003)
recognizes the difficulty of finding acceptable tests for conducting forensic evaluations
when malingering is a concern. The six assessment areas of forensic practice are:
(a) mental state at the offense; (b) risk for violence; (c) risk for sexual violence;
(d) competency to stand trial; (e) competency to waive Miranda rights; and
(f) malingering. Forensic experts were surveyed regarding forensic evaluations of
malingering and they gave acceptable ratings to the SIRS, TOMM, Validity Indicator
Profile, Rey 15-item Visual Memory Test, MMPI-2, PAI, WAIS-III, and Halstead-Reitan
(Lally, 2003). The MCMI-II and MCMI-III had mixed acceptability ratings. No opinion
about acceptability was voiced about the WAS I, KBIT, Luria-Nebraska, and StanfordBinet-Revised. These experts criticized the Rorschach, 16 PF, projective drawings,
sentence completion, and TAT as unacceptable assessment tools for detecting
malingering. Heinze (2003) supported the use of the MMPI-2, SIRS, M Test, the
Atypical Presentation Scale, and the Rey 15-item Memory Test as instruments for
detecting faked psychosis.
Psychological tests have significant shortcomings for detecting malingering and
misinterpretations are frequent. Grillo, Brown, Hilsabeck, Price, and Lees-Haley (1994)
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found with personal injury claimants that elevated scores on the MCMI-II were directly
related to faking bad. Individuals with indications for Histrionic, Compulsive, Schizoid,
Schizotypal, Paranoid, Borderline, Antisocial, Avoidant, and Passive-Aggressive
Personality Disorder were more likely to obtain higher scores on the MMPI-2 validity
indicators for malingering. These findings suggest that certain personality traits are more
likely to result in exaggerated symptoms instead of intentional malingering.
Although there appears to be a variety of psychological tests that are fairly
effective in detecting malingering, none of them is totally failsafe. Kelly, Baker, van den
Broek, Jackson, and Humphries (2005) point out that there is no 'gold standard' for
detecting malingering. Ethical difficulties also play an important role in malingering
research. Although a real-life sample of malingerers would provide more accurate and
generalizable data, recruiting patients who are actively pursuing compensation for
psychological or physical problems poses ethical dilemmas. Whereas simulation studies
are less ethically sensitive, data obtained from a person pretending to malinger may differ
substantially from that obtained from a person who is actually malingering and motivated
to succeed. Other difficulties with attributing certain scores on psychological tests to
malingering is the possibility of individuals' feigning or exaggerating cognitive problems
due to personality disorders without being consciously aware of it (Boone et al., 1995;
Orsini, Van Gorp & Boone, 1988). A major problem in using the MMPI-2 and other
psychological instruments is their inability to detect malingering with regard to specific
symptoms such as back pain. A method of lie detection designed to uncover malingering
at the level of answers to specific questions would be beneficial.
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Psychiatrists are able to detect approximately 50% of the deception that occurs
during unstructured interviews, and this only equals chance discovery (Rosen, Mulsant,
Bruce, Mittal, & Fox, 2004; American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 2004, as
cited in Samuel and Mittenberg, 2005). According to Samuel and Mittenberg, clinicians
are unable to distinguish between truthful, faked, or exaggerated problems based on
demeanor of the client. Because of the varying levels of reliability of most tests, their
high degree of subjectivity, and their dependence on clinical experience and professional
judgment for accurate interpretations, other more objective methods of detecting
malingering must be considered and/or devised.
Cognitive Measures for the Detection of Malingering
Cognitive measures have received some attention in the field of lie detection and
might be useful in the identification of malingering. According to Zuckerman, DePaulo
and Rosenthal (1981), deception places more cognitive demands on individuals than
truth-telling. In order to make lies believable, individuals must focus on internal
coherence, consistency across time, and plausibility in their fabrications. Gombos (2006)
states that effortful cognitive processes such as inhibition, working memory, and other
mental management mechanisms represent essential cognitive elements for lie production
as evidenced by research about lie detection, developmental studies about children and
deception, and imaging studies that describe neural correlates of deception.
Other cognitive cues to lie detection are an increase in pupil dilation and response
latency (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Walczyk and colleagues (2005) hypothesize that
increased understanding about the cognitive processes used during lying might reveal
more clues to detect lies. Neurological studies focus on detecting liars via brain scanning.
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Phan and colleagues (2005) studied the neural correlates of lying by using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Findings suggest that intentional lying relies on
complex cognitive mechanisms which increase neural activity in the discrete anterior
frontal regions (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulated cortex). These data are consistent with
increased brain activity and a larger cognitive load during deception. Back and
Oppenheim (2001) explain that cognitive load represents the information processing
efforts of individuals when faced with tasks, e.g., visual stimuli. The American
Psychological Association (2007) defines cognitive load as "the relative demand imposed
by a particular task, in terms of mental resources required" (p. 189). Cognitive load is
also known as mental load or mental workload (American Psychological Association).
Spence (2008) argues, however, that this science is still in its early stages and
further data is needed. For example, he reports that 16 peer-reviewed fMRI studies have
shown increases in neural activity in prefrontal regions during lying when compared to
truth-telling. However, most of these studies did not succeed in identifying specific brain
areas that were activated by truthfulness. Spence cautions researchers to focus on
improving reliability before applying fMRI assessments to the detection of malingering.
Vrij, Fisher, Mann, and Leal (2006) suggest that the increase in cognitive load
during lying could provide a new measure of detecting deception. They discuss that
learning to attend to signs indicating increased cognitive demands might improve the
ability to detect deception.
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Response Time
Response time has been used as an indicator of lying. It represents the time lapse
between the end of the question asked by the examiner and the beginning of the answer
of the participant. Research suggests that people with well-integrated schemata in their
memory will provide faster responses (Walczyk et al., 2005). A cognitive schemata is
defined as "a collection of basic knowledge about a concept or entity that serves as a
guide to perception, interpretation, imagination, or problem solving" (American
Psychological Association, 2007, p. 815). For example, when reading, a person relies on
previously obtained knowledge and general experiences which aids in comprehension of
the material. A schemata is the organized knowledge structure that can be accessed
during the reading process. Individuals typically utilize their schemata when they relate
new materials to already memorized information. Having access to rich schemata will
increase comprehension of the new material (Alvarez & Risko, 1989).
Vendemia, Buzan and Green (2005) conducted a longitudinal study in which they
examined response time for unrehearsed and rehearsed deception. Findings indicate that
lying creates longer response time than truth-telling, even for individuals who have been
practicing the deception.
Within the context of employment, Holden, Kroner, Fekken, and Popham (1992)
found that honest job applicants compare their answers to their existing self-schemata
such as providing personal information about their work habits. Dishonest applicants who
try to obtain a job for which they are not well-qualified become impression managers,
and they respond more slowly to questions to which they are lying in order to make a
positive but untrue impression.
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Baker, Stern and Goldstein (1990) compared response latencies between
participants who were asked to respond to questions either with the truth or with a lie.
Liars displayed a significantly longer time span between the end of questions and the
beginning of the responses. This supports the notion that it takes more effort to gain
access to fabricated material than to truthful schematas.
Brain-imaging techniques support the conclusion that lying is more timeconsuming than truth-telling. As previously discussed, Spence et al., (2001) found that
lying produces increased neural activation of the bilateral and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortices when brain imaging was performed with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI).
Participants in a study involving mock crimes showed an increase in response
times whenever they were presented information pertaining to a mock crime, but they
responded at a their normal speed to unrelated information (Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, &
Mosmann, 2000). When participants were asked about what concealed knowledge they
had of the mock the crime, response time measures were more accurate than
physiological indicators in predicting faked responses. Walczyk and colleagues (2005)
confirmed that response time differs significantly between truth-tellers and liars. The
researchers also found that social skills function as a moderator variable. For example,
people who possess very good social skills were the fastest responders within the lying
group.
Pupil Dilation
Thousands of years ago, people already believed that eyes provided information
about a person's inner thoughts and emotions, a notion that is confirmed by modern
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studies. Deception impacts pupil dilation. Increases in cognitive load are reflected in
increases in pupil dilation (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). The increase in more
complex thinking strategies often employed during deceptive schemes also is related to
increased pupil dilation. Therefore, dilation provides an objective mechanism for
measuring a person's deception, or at least it may constitute a useful converging cue to
deception.
According to Beatty (1982), eyes are reflective of individuals' cognitive load.
Kimberley and collegues (2008) describe cognitive load as the extent to which cortical
resources are utilized in order to manage thought processes. For example, a large
cognitive load indicates that large amounts of information necessary in order to perform a
task. Specifically, pupil dilation is indicative of increased efforts in cognitive processes
(Van Gerven, Paas, Van Merrienboer, & Schmidt, 2004). In digit span recall, pupil size
becomes larger with increasingly demanding tasks such as adding digits (Granholm,
Asarnow, Sarkin, & Dykes, 1996). Beatty and Lucero-Wagoner (2000) consider the
task-evoked pupillary response as indicative of a response to certain cognitive processes
such as trying to retrieve something from memory, thinking about a difficult subject, or
pausing during a complicated speech.
Ahern and Beatty (1979) found that individuals who were assigned to perform
mental arithmetic showed enlarged pupils whenever the difficulty level was increased. In
an earlier study, Wright and Kahneman (1971) found that increasing difficulty of verbal
comprehension tasks also was reflected in an increase in pupil size. These data indicate
the possibility that pupil dilation may be a cue to malingering.
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Eye Gaze
Other indicators of cognitive load that could provide important information for
the detection of malingering include eye movements, gaze aversion, and eye fixation. For
example, research provides evidence for socially triggered gaze aversion when
individuals are involved in difficult cognitive processes. Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce,
Bonner, Longotham, and Doyle (2002) and Glenberg, Schroeder, and Robertson (1998)
reported an increase in individuals looking away while answering cognitively demanding
questions during communication with others. People appear to have a tendency to avoid
visual stimulation when cognitive demands increase, perhaps to minimize external
distraction. Different theories are proposed to explain gaze aversion such as decreasing
negative feelings within the context of a negative social-emotional situation, feeling selfconscious due to one's previous history of misconduct and deception, and an attempt to
organize the cognitive load that is associated with processing environmental information
(Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005). However, as previously discussed, liars are
frequently aware of this paradigm and make a conscious effort to increase eye gaze
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969).
Intentional deception such as malingering seems to have an effect on certain
physiological responses that are not easily controlled by the individual and, therefore,
appear to be more objective measures for the detection of malingering than the
traditionally used techniques such as psychological assessment. Providing false responses
may increase the cognitive load which impacts certain cognitive cues such as response
time (Baker et al., 1990; Holden et al., 1992). Having to fabricate non-existing
information instead of accessing already existing mental schematas of truthful
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information increase the time needed to provide a deceitful response, and this makes
liars, rehearsed or unrehearsed, slower than those accessing the truth and divulging the
truth (Vendemia et al., 2005).
Processing demands are associated with a decrease in spontaneous eye
movements such as blinking and an increase in fixation (Bagley & Manelis, 1979; May,
Kennedy, Williams, Dunlap, & Brannan, 1990; Underwood, Jebbett, & Roberts, 2004).
Baker and colleagues (1990) found that individuals who received the contradictory
instructions to lie to themselves, while at the same time providing truthful answers,
displayed fewer eye movements and increased response time compared to truth-tellers.
Therefore, eye data appears to be a viable, objective, and measurable detection of
deception.
Rehearsal of Lies
Previous research has shown that rehearsed lying differs from unrehearsed lying
in terms of response time, because the liar must prepare and practice feasible but untrue
lies (Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). Liars who rehearse
beforehand make decisions to lie in advance and prepare fabrications which shorten
response times. Participants who have practiced a certain answer in response to a
particular question show slower responses when the same question is paraphrased
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Harris, 2003).
Time-Restricted Integrity Confirmation (TRI-Con)
A new cognitive method of lie detection based on response time is called TRICon. This approach is based on the Activation-Decision-Construction Model (ADCM) of
lying, and this cognitive measure has been shown to be an effective method of lie
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detection and perhaps malingering (Walczyk, Roper, Seeman & Humphreys, 2003;
Walczyk et al., 2005). In the ADCM, there is a distinction between questions requiring a
"yes" or "no" response versus open-ended questions that trigger cued recall (e.g., "What
is your age?"). The latter typically involve larger cognitive loads because examinees may
have to search their long-term memory. Thus, cognitive cues might be less reliable for the
detection of deception in this format than for yes/no responses. Walczyk and colleagues
(2003) and Walczyk and colleagues (2005) discuss that TRI-Con might be considered the
first approach to lie detection that focuses specifically on maximizing cognitive loads for
liars while minimizing them for truth-tellers. It furthermore helps to protect from
countermeasures of lie detection, such as rehearsal. TRI-Con focuses on cues to
deception such as response time, logical consistency of responses to questions that
inquire about the same topic, and eye data such as pupil dilation, blinking, and eye
fixation.
The activation component in ADCM represents the encoding of questions and the
retrieval of previously stored episodic or semantic memories. During this step, any
important encoded information of semantic and episodic knowledge is activated. The
question occupies the articulatory loop of working memory, and the truthful response is
retrieved from Long Term Memory (Baddeley, 1992; as cited in Walczyk, et al., in
press). Truth-tellers typically decide beforehand to answer truthfully and are able to
access the information quickly and respond within a short time span. This decreases
response time significantly when compared to liars (Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al,
2009).
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The decision component in ADCM, refers to choosing to lie or to tell the truth
based on the question asked. As previously noted, the motivation for malingering
includes "financial gain, escaping responsibility, punishment, imprisonment, or military
duty" (American Psychological Association, 2007, p. 551) and it entails a deliberate act
of faking or exaggerating illness or disability. Like most other self-serving lies,
malingering constitutes protection of the self and occurs in order to improve one's
situation. Liars decide after hearing the question to either lie or tell the truth. This process
usually increases their response time when compared to truth-tellers. Even rehearsed lies
take longer because rehearsed liars do not access their truthful memory but rather have to
remember to tell a lie. This last step seems to be responsible for the increases in time
lapse noted when someone provides false responses (Walczyk et al., 2009).
The construction component ADCM consists of fabricating the lie. During this
phase the truth is a rich retrieval cue to Long Term Memory, whereas lying requires
attention in order to make it plausible and feasible (Walczyk et al., 2009). Various factors
such as social context and knowledge about examiners' suspicions impact the creation of
a lie (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). A screening out of unfeasible or implausible lies takes
place, also a verification with prior statements, and both of theses processes add to
response time (DePaulo, Kasky, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). The ADCM, thus,
provides a theoretical account of the process of lie generation useful for the present
research.
Whereas the ADCM is a theoretical account of lying, TRI-Con is a new method
of lie detection based on the ADCM. TRI-Con involves testing examinees in laboratorylike conditions. The TRI-Con approach for detecting malingering uses cognitive cues in
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order to make clear distinctions between truth-tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and
unrehearsed malingerers. Rehearsal needs to be considered as a possible countermeasure
to cognitive lie detection (DePaulo et al., 2003). TRI-Con consists of an eye tracking
laboratory that has the capability to monitor response time and eye data.
Although many psychological assessments have shown effectiveness in detecting
malingerers, they are far from failsafe in that they often create false positives and false
negatives. The existing measures of malingering only allow diagnosis of a possible
pattern of malingering through false impression management, and they are designed to
measure global psychological constructs. Even in combination with other processes such
as clinical interviews and a review of client history, the danger exists that sophisticated
liars can prepare for the process and "learn" the appropriate symptoms of their
malingered ailment. Therefore, other measures need to be developed that are more
objective and are less amenable to manipulation by clients. Another measure is needed to
assess the truthfulness of declarations about having specific psychological symptoms.
Response time, eye gaze, pupil dilation, and other eye data can provide cues to a
person's truthfulness or deception when answering questions. Applying such cognitive
techniques to assess malingering may minimize examinees' conscious control over such
responses, especially under the cognitive load-maximizing conditions of TRI-Con.
Cognitive cues of deception are difficult to monitor and control by individuals and thus
may provide more reliable data for detecting malingering. TRI-Con is one of these
approaches for measuring cues that are difficult to alter by the client. It may help the
medical and psychological fields by providing more accurate assessments and preventing
malingerers from draining important resources, especially when coupled with eye data.
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Summary
Although psychological testing traditionally has been used for the assessment of
malingering, and other measures are available for identifying people who fake or
exaggerate existing psychological and physiological problems, the problems of false
positives and false negatives warrant a search for more effective methods for detecting
deception. Many of the psychological tests used for diagnosing malingering (e.g., the
MMPI-2) are at best indirect measures of malingering with the purpose of identifying
clinical syndromes instead of focusing on specific instances of deception. More direct
measures of malingering (e.g., TOMM, SIRS) are frequently highly focused either on
particular symptoms or lying about memory deficits or psychotic symptoms. Another
problem with psychological testing is the alternative scoring methods which yield
varying results within the malingering range (e.g., a person could be in extreme distress
or merely expressing a need for help and score high on the F-scale on the MMPI-2).
Multiple measures such as testing with several instruments, obtaining a detailed client
history, and being aware of all possible gains that could be obtained by faking problems,
could increase effectiveness in detection. These methods, however, are time-consuming
and subjective, and require clinical judgment.
Cognitive techniques such as eye gaze, response time, and pupil dilation are
objectively measurable and are difficult to control by examinees. These methods
overcome deliberate coaching to provide fake symptoms and also the examinee
"learning" psychological or medical problems in order to pretend distress. The TRI-Con
approach, coupled with the collection of eye data, is a computerized method for cognitive
lie detection. Although still in its infancy, it holds much promise as a more accurate
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method for detecting malingering. Precision and accuracy in diagnosing malingering has
the potential to prevent financial drain from resources provide a fairer distribution of
resources. TRI-Con may replace inaccurate psychological assessments in the future and
provide clinicians with a clearer picture of their clients' motivation. The current study
utilizes the TRI-Con method to detect malingering, because it is a potentially more
reliable method that prevents false positives in the identification of malingerers.
The purpose of this study is to determine if cognitive cues such as response time,
eye focus, and pupil dilation can discriminate among rehearsed malingerers, unrehearsed
malingerers, and truth-tellers.
Hypotheses
The following Hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 1
Unrehearsed malingerers will display longer response times than rehearsed
malingerers who, in turn, will display longer response times than truth-tellers on
questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms.
Hypothesis 2
Unrehearsed malingerers will have fewer eye movements when answering
questions than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display fewer eye movements
than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms.
Hypothesis 3
Unrehearsed malingerers will have greater pupil dilations as measured by an eye
tracker than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display greater pupil dilations as
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measured by an eye tracker than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their
psychological or physical symptoms.
Hypothesis 4
The time required to answer questions will significantly discriminate between
unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers.
Hypothesis 5
Pupil dilation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers,
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers.
Hypothesis 6
Gaze fixation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers,
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers.
Hypothesis 7
The combination of response times, pupil dilation, and gaze fixation will provide
criteria for categorizations of unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and
truth-tellers significantly better than any of these cues in isolation.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD
The purpose of this study was to determine if cognitive cues, such as response
time, gaze fixation as vertical and horizontal eye movements, and pupil dilation can
discriminate among rehearsed malingerers, unrehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers. A
questionnaire was developed to collect demographic information from the volunteer
participants of this study. A set of four different scenarios was created, providing
instructions to respond in accordance with different malingering conditions.
Participants
A total of 108 undergraduate and graduate participants were recruited from
psychology courses at a mid-sized southern university in the United States after approval
for this research had been obtained from the university's Internal Review Board (IRB). A
copy of the IRB approval application packet appears in Appendix A. Attempts were made
to recruit an ethnically diverse sample. Of the 108 participants, 37 (34.3%) were male, 70
(64.8%) female, and one response to gender was omitted (.9%). The participants reported
19 different college majors. Age range was from 18 to 60 (M = 21.278, SD = 5.275).
Twenty participants (18.5%) identified themselves as African-American, 81 (75%) as
Caucasian-American, one (.9%) as Native-American, three (2.8%) as
Latino/Latina/Hispanic, and three (2.8%) as other ethnicity. For religious affiliation, one
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(.9%) participant was Atheist, two (1.9%) Jewish, one (.9%) Buddhist, 94 (87%)
Christian, two (1.9%) Hindi, and eight (7.4%) other. Forty (37%) of the participants
were Freshman, 15 (13.9%) Sophomore, 20 (18.5%) Junior, 15 (13.9%) Senior, and 18
(16.7%) graduate students. For marital status, 99 (91.7%) were single and nine (8.3%)
were married. English was the first language for 105 (97.2%) of the participants.
Students were offered extra credit by their instructors in exchange for their
participation. An alternative non-research assignment was available for students who did
not wish to participate but who wanted to obtain comparable extra credit. All participants
were treated in accordance with the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct (American Psychological Association, 2002). All data was held in strict
confidence. Students' names were recorded only for extra credit notification to the
instructors and were separated from their data. Moreover, the data was reviewed only by
the researcher and research assistants.
Instrumentation
Demographic Questionnaire
A demographic questionnaire, developed by the experimenter, was administered.
It has eight questions regarding participants' sex, age, ethnicity, religion, student
classification (year in school), college major, marital status, and number of children.
Participants were instructed to either fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate responses
to each item (see APPENDIX B).
Malingering Scenarios and Related Questions
Each of the four malingering scenarios was developed by this researcher, and
required participants to adopt different roles. By describing a situation in which
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malingering is a viable option for attaining certain advantages or to avoiding unpleasant
consequences. The scenarios were written to reflect hypothetical situations that are
realistic and could happen to the participants. They involve sustaining an injury at work
and having the opportunity to receive unjustified time off after being healed (doctor
scenario); missing an exam without a legitimate reason (instructor scenario); recovering
from a psychological disability and then having the opportunity of receiving unjustified
disability payments (disability scenario), and being involved in a car accident (judge
scenario).
In each scenario the main character (role adopted by the participant) is faced with
the dilemma of providing honest feedback (truth teller condition) and possibly risking a
variety of disadvantages or coming up with convincing deceptive responses (unrehearsed
malingering condition, rehearsed malingering condition) and gaining those advantages.
Possible hypothetical risks for the truth-tellers entailed: (a) not being able to use earned
sick leave for staying at home for additional time after having recovered from a workrelated injury; (b) receiving an "F" on a make-up exam resulting in failing a college
course, losing financial aid, and experiencing a decrease of the overall GPA; (c) being
rejected for disability payments for a recovered psychological illness; and (d) receiving
monetary damages for a non-existing physical condition after a car accident during which
the main character was psychologically attacked by the guilty party. The scenarios were
developed so that individuals from diverse backgrounds could relate to their main
character role and would be able to quickly comprehend what is at stake and what
advantages could be gained if they could successfully malinger.
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Each scenario was followed by a set of eight to nine short questions designed to
elicit either yes/no or open-ended responses. For example, a yes/no question from the
instructor scenario was "Were you sick?" An example of an open-ended question for the
same scenario was "What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness?" According to TRICon, yes/no questions and open-ended questions impose different cognitive loads on
examinees and should be analyzed separately (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al.,
2005; Walczyk et al., 2009). Yes/no questions involve recognition memory. For instance,
the question "Have you ever been arrested?" provides the target experience that a
participant needs only verify or deny by searching memory. Open-ended questions
generally require cued recall, a less sensitive memory measure. As an example, "How
many times have you been late for my class?", if asked by an instructor, would require
the recall and tallying of several separate instances of episodic memories, a potentially
time consuming error prone endeavor. The questions were also created for monitoring for
consistency of the responses. All of the scenarios had three pairs of sentences that were
potentially contradictory for consistency checks. For example, during the judge scenario
participants were asked "Did you receive any bodily injuries?" and also "What were your
bodily injuries?" This feature allowed the researcher to monitor if participants
consistently replied according to their malingering condition and also if they remembered
the details of their assumed roles.
The ETL 400 and the Eye Tracking Task
Eye Tracking Laboratory
The ISCAN ETL-400 Tabletop Remote Eye Tracking Laboratory, by ISCAN,
Inc. of Burlington, MA, is an integrated research laboratory which collects eye tracking
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data in the form of pupil size, eye movements, blinking, corneal reflection, and visual
point of regard data of participants in response to presented stimuli. A remote infrared
camera was mounted on a pan/tilt platform on a desk facing the examinee. It has the
ability to track the participant's head in order to keep the eye in the camera's center field
during testing. This camera obtained a clear image of the eye without its illumination
being visible to the participant. ISCAN automatically records the data. The system can be
adjusted quickly to produce information about point of regard, which is the correlation
between raw eye position and the examinee's precise focal point on a computer screen. The
obtained data was superimposed in real-time to the eye tracking monitor. Changes in speed
of eye movements were recorded during the experiment. Recordings of velocity, response
time, and all verbalizations during the experiment were stored on the eye tracking computer.
ISCAN allows for quick calibration. The examinee sat in a comfortable chair responding to
the pre-recorded questions while the examiner ensured that the procedures are understood
and followed.
The TRI-Con approach was used for detecting malingerers because of its potential
to provide cognitive lie detection. Although it is an unconventional method in detecting
malingering at this time, it might provide greater accuracy and a better differentiation
between malingerers and truth-tellers than would be afforded by a cognitive lie detector
focused on cognitive cues to deception.
Before answering questions under TRI-Con, each participant's head was
positioned on a head stand located approximately two feet in front of a computer screen
on which was displaced a tree-lined country scene. The infrared eye scanner was just
below the computer screen; about 1.5 feet in front of the participant's face but did not
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obstruct his or her view of the screen. Before each round of questions (those for the
practice scenario or the four test scenarios), the ETL 400 Infrared Eye Tracker was
calibrated (or recalibrated) for the participant. The examiner would ask the participant to
look in the top left of the screen, top right, bottom left, and bottom right, while the ETL
400 registered eye position via mouse clicks. For each question, the computer controlling
the eye tracker would send a signal over a serial port connected to a second computer that
presented the scenario questions and recorded responses digitally using Audacity. The eye
data would be available for analysis from when a given question was fully asked to when
a participant answered the question.
The ETL 400 takes 60 "snapshots" of the eye per second. In each instance, the
pupil dilation, point of regard (where on the screen), and other variables were stored in an
ASCII file that can be read by other software for analysis. Following calibration, the
computer screen, which participants were told to focus on during testing, has a virtual
coordinate system of pixels corresponding to where participants are looking on it. The
origin is in the upper, left hand corner (horizontals, vertical=0). The bottom right has
coordinates horizontal^ 11, vertical=511. Thus, units of pupil dilation and other eye data
are expressed in pixels falling within a horizontal and vertical range of 0 to 512. For each
question, the time needed to answer bounded the relevant eye data for that question. If it
took 1.5 seconds, a total of 90 eye snapshots were available. The median pupil dilation
during that time was taken as the measure of pupil dilation. On the advice of personnel at
I-Scan, Inc. of Woburn, Massachusetts, manufacturers of the ETC 400, the standard
deviations of the horizontal and vertical points of regard while answering a question
were calculated and used as the measures of eye movement. Because they are in standard
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deviation units, they are also expressed in pixels of movement. Based on previous
research, greater pupil dilation and smaller eye movement were interpreted in the present
research as indicative of greater cognitive load.
Audacity Software
Audacity, a free, open source recording and editing software, was downloaded for
recording the questions and answers of each scenario. Audacity software has been
developed by a group of experts and is currently distributed under the GNU General
Public License. Audacity digitally records live audio input and converts the auditory
information into digital representations which enable users to change the speed or pitch
of the recorded files (Audacity Source, 2009).
Audacity allows experimenters to analyze recordings by providing graphic
representations of pitch and frequency. For example, silence is represented as a flat line,
whereas any type of sound is manifested as waves, their height increasing with volume.
The graphics of the program do not discriminate between voice sounds or background
noises and register any auditory information graphically.
Response Time Measurement
Each participant's answers to questions were saved in a separate Audacity file.
Audacity allows determining the time needed to answer a question to the millisecond
level of precision. The software provided a visual metric, much like a meter stick, that
measured time visually as the length on the screen between waves. Recordings were also
transcribed verbatim, allowing the coding for consistency across inter-related questions
and for the presence of filler (utterances that are non-responsive to questions).
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Consistency Coding
Walczyk and colleagues (2009) describe inconsistent answers as explicitly or
implicitly contradicting previously provided answers or answers that are impossible in
reality. For example, if participants replied "Yes" to Question 2 ("Did you receive any
bodily injuries?") during the judge scenario, they were also expected to provide a short
description of the type of their injuries for Question 4 ("What were your bodily
injuries?"), not say "None," If participants provided a "Yes" response to the first
question, but were unable to name their injury, it was coded as an instance of
inconsistency for this scenario. Consistency requires memorization of the previously
asked question and the answer given. Furthermore, inconsistencies provided responses
checks on their adherence with the experimental instructions. For example, participants
who were asked to malinger and answered "Yes" to Question 7 ("Are you ready to return
to work?") during the doctor scenario, were inconsistent with their overall role for their
experimental condition. The consistent response would have been "No" because
participants were instructed to malinger and gain additional sick leave in order to stay at
home (three question pairs as consistency checks for all the scenarios). Inconsistent
responses were summed up across scenarios for each participant to give the total number
of inconsistencies, which was used in the exploratory analyses. APPENDIX C shows the
coding forms indicating the pairs of questions that were inter-related and served as
consistency checks.
Filler Coding
Filler is any verbal utterance which is non-responsive to the question. Examples
are "uhm" and "ahh." For this study, instances of filler were counted when they preceded
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the actual answer, usually prolonging the response time. The instances of such filler were
tallied for each of the scenarios. When an answer began with filler, for example, "Uhm,
no", "No" was considered the time when the actual answer began. This provided more
accurate response times. For the exploratory analysis, instances of filler were summed
across the scenarios for each participant.
Procedure
General Procedures for All Conditions
First informed consent was obtained from each participant, and any of their
questions were answered. Participants were informed then about their experimental
condition by a greeter, which was done randomly. Greeters read to participants
instructions appropriate to their conditions. Participants were escorted to the eye tracking
laboratory.
A Practice Scenario and practice questions preceded the four test scenarios.
Examinees in all three malingering conditions (rehearsed malingering, unrehearsed
malingering, truth-telling) all read through the same four test scenarios. What
differentiated experimental conditions were their instructions concerning how to respond
specifically to the questions. Truth-tellers were instructed to tell the truth to all questions
according to their assigned roles; whereas participants in the two malingering conditions
were instructed to deceive. The rehearsed malingerers were the only group able to review
the questions pertaining to the scenarios and were able to prepare their deceptive answers
in advance according to their assigned roles. The other two conditions (unrehearsed
malingering, truth-telling) were asked the same questions, but again, without an
opportunity to rehearse their responses. Questions to each scenario were designed to elicit
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yes/no or short answers, consistent with recommendations for conducting lie detection
examinations under TRI-Con (Walczyk et al., 2005). A copy of the scenarios and related
questions appears in APPENDIX D. The instructions summarized below make clear the
task required of participants in each condition.
Roles of the Greeter and the Examiner
This experiment required two experimenters: (a) a greeter who obtained informed
consent, assigned malingering conditions, read instructions, collected information via
demographic questionnaires, and debriefed participants (Debriefing Statement see
APPENDIX E), and (b) a TRI-Con examiner who started the testing program, calibrated
the eye tracker, and monitored eye movements of the participants during the experiment
to ensure accuracy of the data. The examiner also read the scenarios to participants as the
latter followed along holding a hard copy (Instructions for Greeters appear in Appendix
F; Instructions for Examiners appear in APPENDIX G).
Instructions for Truth-tellers, Rehearsed Liars, and Unrehearsed Liars
A general set of instructions provided an overview of the procedures under TRICon, an overview of the scenarios, and so forth. A copy appears in Appendix H.
Truth-tellers
Truth-tellers were asked to reply honestly to all questions pertaining to the
scenario according to the roles they were asked to adopt in each scenario. They were
advised to answer as convincing as possible.
Unrehearsed Malingerers
Unrehearsed malingerers were asked to provide untruthful responses to all
questions pertaining to the scenario according to their assigned roles. They were advised
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to be as convincing as possible and to fake psychological or physiological distress in
order to obtain an advantage or avoid a punishment.
Rehearsed Malingerers
These participants received the exact same instructions from the greeter
concerning how to respond that the unrehearsed malingerers did. However, before the
testing under TRI-Con for each scenario, participants were given copies of the related
questions and were allowed three minutes in which to prepare deceptive answers.
For all three conditions, the scenarios were read slowly by the examiner in the eye
tracking laboratory. A hard copy of each scenario was given to the participants so that
they could follow along. Questions had been digitally recorded previously and asked after
each scenario was read. All answers were digitally recorded. The same procedure was
followed for the other three scenarios. The order of the four test scenarios was
randomized over participants to control for possible order effects.
Participants wore a microphone headset that was connected to a desktop
computer. The microphone was positioned close to the examinee's mouth. The computer
recorded answers using Audacity. Participants were seated in a comfortable chair facing
away the examiner, who sat at a computer screen controlling the eye tracker. Examiners
were also blind to the malingering condition in order to minimize experimental bias.
Data Analysis
This study is a between-subjects design and had 34 participants in the unrehearsed
malingering condition, 34 participants in the rehearsed malingering condition, and 40
participants in the truth-telling experimental condition. In order to simplify this
complicated data set to an analyzable form, median response times, pupil dilation, and
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eye movements were determined for each question type (yes/no, open-ended) within each
scenario for each participant. Using the medians of these measures avoided the
potentially skewing effects of influential outliers which are common in these kinds of
data (Hays, 1994; Walczyk et al., 2009). The data gathering for each question began
when the digitally recorded question had been fully asked and was terminated when the
participant first began his/her answer. A One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
followed by the Newman-Keuls post-hoc procedure (Hays, 1994) was used to analyze the
data. ANOVAS are hypothesis-testing statistical procedures that evaluate mean
differences between different experimental conditions (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2004).
In review, for this study, the malingering conditions (Independent Variables)
were: (a) truth-telling, (b) rehearsed malingering, and (c) unrehearsed malingering. The
measured outcomes (Dependent Variables) were: (a) response times, (b) horizontal eye
movement, (c) vertical eye movement, and (c) pupil dilation.
The means for the response times, eye movement data, and pupil dilation for each
participant were calculated and analyzed. These means were compared across the three
experimental conditions and question types. The purpose of this analysis was to
determine if cognitive data differs between truth-tellers and individuals who are
malingering. The impact of rehearsal also was analyzed by comparing the data from
rehearsed malingerers with that of unrehearsed malingerers and that of truth-tellers.
The initially proposed discriminant analyses could not be conducted due to
technical problems with the recording of the eye data and the resulting low numbers of
participants in each condition. Thus, it was impossible to have separate calibrations and
validation sub-samples.
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For Hypotheses 1 through 3, a one-way ANOVA was used to analyze the mean
differences in response times, eye gaze (horizontal and vertical eye movements), and
pupil dilation between truth-tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and unrehearsed malingerers.
Hypotheses 4 through 7 were untestable because, as explained above, the discriminant
function analysis was not possible.
Hypothesis 1
Response times were determined for each question from each of the four
scenarios and determined to the millisecond precision. Missing data, which occurred due
to random technical glitches such as the examiner failing to reactivate the Audacity
recorder for a particular question, were excluded from the analysis. This happened
infrequently (< 2% of the scores).
Hypothesis 2
Eye gaze was measured by the ETL 400 separately as horizontal eye movement
and vertical eye movement and recorded as numerical data. These numbers are expressed
in screen pixels and correspond to average eye movements made during the time used to
answer each question. The total possible number of pixels horizontally and vertically is
512. Missing data were excluded from analyses (< 2% of the scores).
Hypothesis 3
Pupil dilation was measured and recorded as numerical data by the ETL 400 eye
tracker. As with eye movements, pupil dilation was measured in screen pixel units with a
possible range from 0 to 512. The data used for each question was the median level of
pupil dilation during the time the participant used to answer a given question. Recall that
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the ETL 400 takes 60 "pictures" of the eye each second. Again, missing data were not
entered (<2% of the scores).
Hypotheses 4 through 7
Hypotheses 4 through 7 concerned using response times, pupil dilation, and gaze
fixation (the opposite of eye movements) as cues to deception in K-means discriminate
analyses. However, as noted above, technical problems, missing data, and an insufficient
number of participants tested resulted in insufficient sample size to support the
calibration and validation sub-samples needed to have discriminant functions of sufficient
power.

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the statistical results of the experiment.
The following section provides the means, standard deviations, and total number of
participants for each experimental condition for relevant Hypotheses 1-3. Results of
exploratory analyses also are provided.
Participants
The sample for this experiment consisted of adult college students ranging in age
from 18 to 60 years who were enrolled in undergraduate/graduate college courses at a
midsize southern university. A total of 108 participants completed the study. However,
due to initial technical problems with the eye tracker, only 90 of these produced
successfully recorded eye data (eye movements and pupil dilation), and these comprised
the sample used in the data analyses.
Descriptive Statistics
Hypotheses 1 through 3 were tested using the statistical procedure of a 2 x 3
mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The within-subjects factor was question type
with two levels: yes/no, open-ended. The between-subjects factor was the malingering
condition with three levels: unrehearsed malingering, rehearsed malingering, and truthtelling. In the significant main effect for malingering condition, the studentized Newman-
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Keuls procedure (Hays, 1994) was used to determine those means that were significantly
different at alpha of .05. Although no hypotheses specifically concerned question type, it
was expected based on past research that yes/no questions would entail shorter response
times and less cognitive load (less pupil dilation; more eye movement) than open-ended
questions (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike,
& Griffith-Ross, 2009). Effect sizes in the form of eta squared (fj2) are reported for all
significant main or interactive effects.
Results for Hypotheses
Hypothesis I
Unrehearsed malingerers will display longer response times than rehearsed
malingerers who, in turn, will display longer response times than truth-tellers on
questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms.
Means and standard deviations for response times are reported in Table 1 by
scenario, question type, and condition. Regarding the doctor scenario, a significant main
effect was found for question type, F(l, 104) = 76.552,/? = .000, r\2 = .424. There were
significantly longer response times for open-ended questions than for yes/no questions,
replicating previous research (e.g., Walczyk et al., 2009). There also was a significant
main effect for the malingering condition, F(2, 104) = 3.411, p = .037, rj2 = .062. The
Newman-Keuls post-hoc procedure revealed a significant difference only between
truth-tellers and unrehearsed malingerers. The experimental condition x question type
interaction also was significant, F(l, 104) = 7317, p = .001. It can be seen in Table 1 that
responses to yes/no questions are similar across malingering conditions. For open-ended
questions, however, there is a large difference between malingerers and truth-tellers.
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Open-ended questions provided the best cues to deception. Hypothesis 1 was partially
supported in this case.
A significant main effect was found for question type in the instructor scenario,
F(l, 102) = 89.752,/? = .000, x\2= .468. There were significantly longer response times
for open-ended questions. There was no significant main effect for the malingering
condition, F(2, 102) = 1.767,/? = .176, however, the malingering condition x question
type interaction was significant, F(l, 102) = 4.675,/? = .011. Larger differences between
unrehearsed malingerers and truth-tellers were observed for open-ended than yes/no
questions (see Table 1). Hypothesis 1 was not supported in this case.
For the disability scenario, a significant main effect was again found for question
type, F(l, 104) = 92.241,p = .000, if = .470. There were significantly longer response
times for open-ended questions. However, there was no significant main effect for
experimental condition, F(2,104) = 1.865,/? = .160, nor was the malingering condition x
question type interaction significant, F(2, 104) = .023,/? = .977. Hypothesis 1 was not
supported in this instance.
Regarding the judge scenario, a significant main effect was again found for
question type, F(l, 104) = 25.599,/? = .000, r\2= .198. There also were significantly
longer response times for open-ended questions. Furthermore, there was a significant
main effect for malingering condition, F(2,104) = 8.396, /? = .000, if = .139. The
Newman-Keuls post-hoc procedure revealed significant differences between truth-tellers
and unrehearsed malingerers as well as between truth-tellers and rehearsed malingerers.
The malingering condition x question type interaction also was significant,
F{2,104) = 2.396,/? = .096, rj2=. 044. Examination of means from Table 1 reveal large
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differences for open-ended questions only, and smaller differences for the yes/no
questions. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported in this case.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Response Times by Question Type, Scenario, and Malingering
Condition
Malingering Condition

Question Type

Truth

Unrehearsed

Rehearsed

Tellers

Malingerers

Malingerers

M

M

M

SD

N

SD

N

SD

N

Yes/No Response Times
Doctor

.851 .237

40

.937.399 34

.931 .338 33

Instructor

1.073 .347

40

1.020.301 34

.877 .331 31

Disability

.793 .258

40

.934.350 34

.838 .233 33

Judge

.792 .314

40

1.160.555 34

.916 .307 33

Open-ended Response Times
Doctor

.942 .314

40

1.241 .457 34

1.164 .392 33

Instructor

1.268 .443

40

1.458.492 34

1.287 .347 31

Disability

1.036 .274

40

1.179.522 34

1.070 .379 33

.976 .332

40

1.245 .407 34

1.203 .353 33

Judge
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Hypothesis 2
Unrehearsed malingerers will have fewer eye movements when answering
questions than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display fewer eye movements
than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their psychological or physical symptoms.
Summary statistics for horizontal eye movements appear in Table 2 by
malingering condition, scenarios, and question type. The next four analyses concerned
the horizontal eye movement data. For the doctor scenario, a significant main effect was
found for question type, F{\, 61) = 9.015,p = .004, r\ = .129. There was significantly
greater horizontal eye movement for yes/no questions, which suggested lower cognitive
load, consistent with expectations. However, there was no significant main effect for the
malingering condition, F(2, 61) = .977, p = .382, nor was the malingering condition x
question type interaction significant, F(2, 61) = .459, p = .634. Hypothesis 2 was not
supported in this case.
A significant main effect was found for question type for the instructor scenario,
F(l, 84) = 36.630, p = .000, r\2= .304. Significantly greater horizontal eye movement for
open-ended questions was found, the opposite of what was found in the doctor scenario,
and inconsistent with expectations (Walczyk et al., 2005). However, there was no
significant main effect for experimental condition, F(2, 84) = .050, p = .951. The
experimental condition x question type interaction also was not significant,
F(2, 84) = .088, p = .916. Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
In the disability scenario, a significant main effect was found for question type,
F{\, 84) = 5.890,/? = .017, f|2= .066. As for the instructor scenario, there was
significantly greater horizontal eye movement for open-ended questions, contrary to
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expectations. There was no significant main effect for malingering condition, F(2, 84) =
1.952,/? = . 148, nor was the malingering condition x question type interaction significant,
F(2, 84) = .152, p = .634. Hypothesis 2 was, again, not supported.
Regarding the judge scenario, no significant main effect was found for question
type, F(l, 84) = .550, p = .461, contrary to the other scenarios. There was no significant
difference in horizontal eye movement between yes/no and open-ended questions. There
was no significant main effect for malingering condition, F(2, 84) = .488,/? = .616. The
malingering condition x question type interaction also was not significant,
F(2, 84) = 2.277, p = .109. Hypothesis 2 was not supported here as well. Overall, the
pattern of results across the scenarios was a lack of support for Hypothesis 2 with the
horizontal eye movement data.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Horizontal Eye Movements by Question Type, Scenario and
Malingering Condition
Malingering Condition

Question Type

Truth

Unrehearsed

Rehearsed

Tellers

Malingerers

Malingerers

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD N

Yes/No
Horizontal Eye Movement
Doctor

62.164 25.949 25

54.279 32.610 20

71.557 38.770 19

Instructor

52.321 38.674 35

49.543 39.565 26

52.567 30.944 26

Disability

60.230 36.989 34

48.97137.047 26

66.312 39.634 27

Judge

61.495 39.328 34

60.12141.441 26

72.648 34.414 27

Open-ended
Horizontal Eye Movement
Doctor

52.867 28.207 25

47.349 34.558 20

56.378 36.171 19

Instructor

72.875 39.305 35

69.998 41.275 26

70.15134.452 26

Disability

66.417 34.165 34

52.908 37.396 26

73.506 38.400 27

Judge

68.380 39.659 34

61.532 40.697 26

68.977 33.059 27

63
Summary statistics for the vertical eye movement data are provided in Table 3.
Regarding the doctor scenario, a significant main effect occurred for question type,
F(l, 61) = 8.686,;? - .005, fj2 = .125. There was significantly greater vertical eye
movement for yes/no questions, just as occurred with the doctor scenario with horizontal
eye movement. Again, this was expected. However, there was no significant main effect
for the malingering condition, F(2, 61) = .920, p = .404. The malingering condition x
question type interaction was not significant, F(2, 61) = 1.445,/? = .244. Hypothesis 2
was, again, not confirmed.
In the instructor scenario, a significant main effect was found for question type,
F(l, 84) = 33.807, p = .000, if = .287. There was significantly greater vertical eye
movement for open-ended questions, again, inconsistent with the doctor scenario and
inconsistent with expectations of greater cognitive load with open-ended questions.
However, there was no significant main effect for malingering condition, F(2, 84) = .178,
p = .837. Again the malingering condition x question type interaction was not significant,
F(2, 84) = .232, p = .794. Hypothesis 2 was not supported in this scenario.
A significant main effect was found for question type for the disability scenario,
F(l, 84) - 5.664,/? = .020, if = .063. There was significantly greater vertical eye
movement for open-ended questions, contrary to expectations. The main effect for
malingering condition was not significant, F(2, 84) = 1.388,/? = .255, as was the
malingering condition x question type interaction, F(2, 84) = .621,/? = .540. Again,
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
For the judge scenario, a significant main effect also was found for question type,
F(l, 84) = 4.846,/? = .030, if = .055. There were significantly greater vertical eye
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movements for open-ended questions, contrary to expectations. However, there was no
significant main effect in the malingering condition, F(2, 84) = .964, p = .386, nor for the
malingering condition x question type interaction, F(2, 84) = .957,p = .388. Hypothesis
2, again, was not supported. As with the horizontal eye movement data, the overall
pattern with of the vertical eye movement data provides no support for Hypothesis 2.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for Vertical Eye Movement by Question Type, Scenario and
Malingering Condition
Malingering Condition

Question Type

Truth

Unrehearsed

Rehearsed

Tellers

Malingerers

Malingerers

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

Yes/No
Vertical Eye Movement
Doctor

59.076 28.733 25

55.036 34.667 20

74.909 44.833 19

Instructor

48.010 34.200 35

42.465 31.712 26

49.933 32.580 26

Disability

56.679 33.185 34

46.892 36.469 26

62.522 43.338 27

Judge

54.165 32.287 34

55.859 39.891 26

67.591 35.226 27

Doctor

52.447 26.657 25

50.058 34.459 20

56.608 38.611 19

Instructor

64.914 33.343 35

63.016 34.10126

65.378 39.190 26

Disability

58.533 30.114 34

52.329 36.57126

69.484 42.994 27

Judge

61.937 32.750 34

58.507 38.053 26

69.774 35.364 27

Open-ended
Vertical Eye Movement
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Hypothesis 3
Unrehearsed malingerers will have greater pupil dilations as measured by an eye
tracker than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn, will display greater pupil dilations as
measured by an eye tracker than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their
psychological or physical symptoms.
Means and standard deviations for pupil dilation can be found in Table 4. In the
doctor scenario, no significant main effect was found for question type, F(l,61) = 1.043,
p = .311. In other words, there was no significant difference in pupil dilation between
yes/no and open-ended questions, contrary to expectation. There was no significant main
effect for malingering condition, F(2,61) = .038,/* = .963. Also, the experimental
condition x question type interaction was not significant, F(2,61) = .739, p = .482.
Hypothesis 3 was not supported in the doctor scenario.
A significant main effect was found for question type for the instructor scenario,
F(l,85) = 42.191,/? = .000, f|2= .332. There was significantly greater pupil dilation for
open-ended questions, which makes sense given their expected greater cognitive load.
However, there was no significant main effect for the malingering condition, F(2,85) =
.270, p = .764. Finally, the malingering condition x question type interaction was
nonsignificant, F(2,85) = .135,/? = .874. Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
A significant main effect was found in the disability scenario for question type,
F(l,86) = 4.892, p = .030, f|2 = .054. As expected, there was significantly greater pupil
dilation for open-ended questions. However, there was no significant main effect for the
malingering condition, F(2,86) = .088,/? = .916. Also, the malingering condition x

question type interaction was non-significant, F(2, 85) = 1.657, p = .197. Hypothesis 3
again was not supported.
No significant main effect was found for question type in the judge scenario, F(l,
86) = 1.876, p = . 174. There was no significant difference in pupil dilation between
yes/no and open-ended questions, nor was there a significant main effect in the
malingering condition, F(2, 86) = .383, p = .683. Not surprisingly, the malingering
condition x question type interaction nonsignificant, F(2, 86) = 1.153, p = .320.
Hypothesis 3 was not supported for this scenario. Across the four scenarios, there is no
support for the hypotheses that malingering entails more pupil dilation than truth-telling
or that rehearsal lowers cognitive load.
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Table 4
Summary Statistics for Pupil Dilation by Question Type, Scenario and Malingering
Condition
Malingering Condition

Question Type

Truth

Unrehearsed

Rehearsed

Tellers

Malingerers

Malingerers

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

Yes/No Pupil Dilation
Doctor

69.124 14.144 25

70.775 18.184 20

69.586 12.585 19

Instructor

59.175 19.459 35

60.887 22.560 27

63.194 21.534 26

Disability

67.267 14.788 35

68.637 15.441 27

68.382 12.724 27

Judge

66.929 14.255 35

68.328 11.106 27

69.417 12.520 27

Open-ended Pupil Dilation
Doctor

69.432 14.613 25

69.829 15.967 20

68.713 12.337 19

Instructor

70.384 15.278 35

72.118 15.635 27

72.573 12.703 26

Disability

68.746 15.404 35

70.343 14.660 27

68.195 13.183 27

Judge

66.870 15.570 35

69.953 13.309 27

69.789 11.791 27
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Hypothesis 4
The time required to answer questions will significantly discriminate between
unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and truth- tellers.
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could
not be tested.
Hypothesis 5
Pupil dilation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers,
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers.
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could
not be tested.
Hypothesis 6
Gaze fixation will significantly discriminate between unrehearsed malingerers,
rehearsed malingerers, and truth-tellers.
As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could
not be tested.
Hypothesis 7
The combination of response times, pupil dilation, and gaze fixation will provide
criteria for categorizations of unrehearsed malingerers, rehearsed malingerers, and truthtellers significantly better than any of these cues in isolation.
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As noted above, discriminant functions for a calibration and validation samples
could not be estimated due to insufficient sample size, thus Hypotheses 4 through 7 could
not be tested.
Exploratory Analysis
The following exploratory analyses were conducted. No specific hypotheses were
put forth in the introduction concerning these analyses, however, contradictions across
questions and filler have been proposed as possible cues to deception (Walczyk et al.,
2003; Walczyk et a., 2005; Walczyk et a., 2009). A one-way ANOVA was used for the
exploratory analyses.
No significant main effect was found for filler in the malingering condition,
F(2, 105) = 1.159, p = .318, however, significant main effects were found for
inconsistencies, F(2, 105) = 4.732, p = .011. Surprisingly, participants in the truth-telling
condition had significantly more inconsistencies than the unrehearsed and rehearsed
malingerers. Means, standard deviations, and numbers of participants for each
experimental condition for inconsistencies and filler appear in Table 5.

71
Table 5
Summary Statistics for Filler and Inconsistencies by Malingering Condition
Malingering Condition

Truth

Unrehearsed

Rehearsed

Tellers

Malingerers

Malingerers

M

Total Filler
Total Inconsistencies

SD

N

.925 2.759

40

1.075 2.093

40

M

SD

N

1.971 4.210 34
.265

.994 34

M

SD

N

1.088 2.021 34
.148 .558 34
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Summary of Results
Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes for response times, horizontal eye
movements, vertical eye movements, and pupil dilation were calculated for each question
type (yes/no, open-ended) and malingering condition (truth-tellers, rehearsed
malingerers, unrehearsed malingerers) by using a mixed-model ANOVA. The
studentized Newman-Keuls procedure (Hays, 1994) was used to determine means that
were significantly different at an alpha of .05 in the case of the malingering condition.
Findings from the study partially supported Hypothesis 1 because response times
differed significantly for malingering conditions across two of the four scenarios (doctor
and judge). As predicted, truth-tellers had significantly shorter response times than both
groups of malingerers. However, the hypothesized significant difference between
rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers was not found. Therefore, rehearsal did not have a
significant impact on response time.
Horizontal eye movements did not differ significantly across malingering
conditions. Hypothesis 2 predicted that truth-tellers would have significantly more eye
movement than rehearsed malingerers, who in turn would have significantly more eye
movement than the unrehearsed malingerers. High levels of eye movement indicate less
of a cognitive load (Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk, Mahoney,
Doverspike & Griffith-Ross, 2009). Therefore, the horizontal eye movement data does
not support Hypothesis 2. The vertical eye movements also failed to support Hypothesis 2
with no significant differences of vertical eye movements across the malingering
conditions.
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Similar to the eye movement, pupil dilation failed to support previous findings
that increases in pupil dilation due to increased cognitive load occurs due to deception.
No significant differences in pupil dilation were found across the malingering conditions.
Hypotheses 4 through 7 could not be tested because of the inability to perform a
discriminant analysis. The overall findings of the study suggest that response time is the
best cognitive cue of malingering. However, response time fails to discriminate between
rehearsed and unrehearsed malingering.
Filler and inconsistencies were counted for each malingering condition. Whereas
no significant difference was found for the frequency of filler in each condition, there
were significantly more inconsistencies for truth-tellers than for malingerers. This
surprising finding, among others, will be interpreted in the discussion that follows.

CHAPTER4
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this experiment was to explore whether or not cognitive data
(response time, eye gaze, and pupil dilation) can provide significant discrimination
between individuals who are telling the truth, individuals who have rehearsed their
malingering, and individuals who malinger without the possibility for rehearsal. The
independent variables for this experimental design were the three treatment conditions:
(a) truth-telling, (b) unrehearsed malingering, and (c) rehearsed malingering. The
dependent variables were the cognitive cues for detecting malingering: (a) response time,
(b) horizontal eye movements, (c) vertical eye movements, and (d) pupil dilation.
Differences based on answer type (yes/no versus open-ended) also were examined.
Exploratory analysis focused on the relationship between experimental condition and the
number of inconsistent responses. Another exploratory analysis was conducted in order to
determine relationships between experimental condition and the number of initial filler
used by the participants.
The following discussion of this experiment begins with an overall description of
the research. Then, the seven proposed hypotheses are discussed separately and
interpreted. Two types of exploratory analyses will be described and interpreted before
providing an overall discussion of the results. The final portion of this chapter is
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dedicated to suggestions for further research in this area and identifying limitations of
this experiment.
Overview
The purpose of this experiment was the development of a research model in order
to explore the effectiveness of cognitive cues for the detection of malingering. Cognitive
cues were chosen because they provide an observable measure of cognitive load which
differs depending on the demands placed on memory and overall thought processes.
Truth-tellers are assumed to have a smaller cognitive load because they search their
memory for existing factual information whereas individuals who answer deceptively
have an increased cognitive load due not only to having to search their memory for the
existing truthful response but also having to create new information that alters the truth.
Rehearsal of deception is supposed to decrease the cognitive load because these
individuals have the opportunity to prepare their answers and store this new information
in memory for later retrieval, however, it their cognitive load is still larger than that of
truth-tellers.
The current malingering study found partial support for previous research
studying cognitive data in the context of lie detection. Response times were analyzed
across the three different malingering conditions and also across question type (yes/no
versus open-ended). Whereas response time was found to partially differentiate between
malingerers and truth-tellers, it failed to provide this differentiation across all question
types. It also failed to differentiate between rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers. Eye
gaze was measured as horizontal and vertical eye movements and also was analyzed
across the malingering conditions and the question type. This cognitive measure did not
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provide significant differences between the malingering groups. Another type of
cognitive data that failed to provide significant identification of each malingering
condition was pupil dilation. The following conclusions provide an interpretation of the
results for each of the seven hypotheses.
Conclusion
A discussion of each of the first three hypotheses will follow. Hypotheses 4
through 7 could not be further investigated due to technical problems with the study and a
resulting sample size that was too small for discriminant analyses. Therefore, the
discussion will focus separately on Hypotheses 1 through 3 and report exploratory
findings.
Interpretation of Hypothesis I
In the first hypothesis, unrehearsed malingerers were predicted to display longer
response times than rehearsed malingerers, who in turn, would display longer response
times than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their psychological or physical
symptoms. This hypothesis was partially supported because response times for half of the
scenarios were significantly longer for malingerers than truth-tellers. However, no
significant differences were found between rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers. Due
to the design of this study, truth-tellers may have had similar cognitive schemata during
the scenarios because they had to pretend to be truth-tellers. Walczyk and colleagues
(2005) stated that individuals with well-integrated schemata in their memory are able to
respond faster. In other words, actual truth-tellers who store factual information in their
episodic memory can retrieve this knowledge faster than individuals who have to make
up information.
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The results from the response data only partially confirmed previous research
which found that deception increases cognitive demands, in other words, create a greater
cognitive load, which can be measured by analyzing response times and eye data
(Vendemia Buzan & Simon-Dade, 2005; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; Walczyk, et
al., 2005; Zuckermann, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). However, the findings did not
confirm that rehearsal has a significant impact on response time. Response times for
rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers did not differ significantly. This finding
contradicts previous research in which practicing a deceptive response was found to
significantly decrease response time (DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009).
Interpretation of Hypothesis 2
In the second hypothesis, it was predicted unrehearsed malingerers would have
fewer eye movements when answering questions than rehearsed malingerers who, in turn,
would display fewer eye movements than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their
psychological or physical symptoms. Eye movements also described as eye gaze
indicates the level of cognitive load. Individuals who place large demands on their
cognitive functioning display fewer eye movements than individuals with smaller
cognitive loads (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; Glenberg, Schroeder & Robertson, 1998).
Eye movements were examined in the current study by two different measures:
horizontal and vertical movements. None of the eye movement data supported
Hypotheses Two. There was no significant difference between the malingering
conditions. Therefore, eye movement did not provide a cue for detecting malingering nor
did it differentiate between rehearsed and unrehearsed malingerers.

78

The eye movement data contradicted previous research findings
(Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; Glenberg, Schroeder & Robertson, 1998). However,
previous research also suggests that an intentional change in eye gaze or eye movements
may result in the opposite effect. Ekman & Friesen (1969) reported that liars are
frequently aware of their eye contact being observed, and they may intentionally change
their eye movements in order to avoid direct eye contact. In the current study, all
malingering groups were instructed to answer in a believable way which might have
encouraged them to change their eye movements. Compared to the other cognitive data,
eye movement seems to be the one set of cues that is easily manipulated by individuals,
whereas response time and pupil dilation take place on a less voluntary basis.
As mentioned previously, the research design created pretend situations for all
malingering groups. Essentially, the truth-tellers also were faced with additional
cognitive loads because they had to accurately remember their truthful situation. Overall,
the eye movement data did not provide reliable differentiation between all three
conditions.
Interpretation of Hypothesis 3
In Hypothesis 3, unrehearsed malingerers were predicted to have greater pupil
dilations, as measured by an eye tracker than rehearsed malingerers, who in turn, would
display greater pupil dilations than truth-tellers on questions pertaining to their
psychological and physical symptoms. An increase in cognitive load is reflected in an
increase in pupil dilation (Beatty, 1982; Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Granholm,
Asarnow, Sarkin & Dykes, 1996; Van Gerven, Paas, Van Merrienboer & Schmidt, 2004).
Therefore, truth-tellers who are assumed to have the smallest cognitive load would have
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less pupil dilation than rehearsed malingerers who in turn would have less pupil dilation
than unrehearsed malingerers. As with the eye movement data, however, pupil dilation
did not provide significant differentiation between the malingering conditions. Again, this
may be due to the fact that all of the malingering groups had a similar level of cognitive
load due to having to learn and remember their roles and situational contexts. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the findings of the current study.
Interpretation of the Exploratory Data
Although not hypothesized, other factors were analyzed for significance across
malingering conditions. First, inconsistencies were summed up across the scenarios in
order to determine significant differences among the three malingering conditions.
Previous research has indicated that inconsistencies are significantly more prevalent in
situations that increase cognitive load (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij el al, 2000). Therefore,
truth-tellers should have had significantly fewer inconsistencies than rehearsed
malingerers, who in turn, should have had significantly fewer inconsistencies than
unrehearsed malingerers. It was interesting to note that truth-tellers had significantly
more inconsistencies than unrehearsed and rehearsed malingerings. This may be due to
truth-tellers being actually in a pretend situation and having difficulty remembering their
"pretend" truth. The other two conditions were not significantly different from each
other, and this finding failed to support previous research.
Second, instances of fillers were summed up across malingering conditions. These
nonresponsive utterances were counted only when preceding the actual answer, which
would have prolonged the response time. No significant differences were found for filler
across the malingering conditions.
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Third, questions were divided into yes/no or open-ended types and separately
analyzed. Whereas yes/no questions entail recognition memory and provide participants
with information which they can either deny or confirm, open-ended questions involve
cued recall and provide opportunities for a variety of different responses. Open-ended
questions place larger demands on cognitive functioning, thereby increasing an
individual's cognitive load (Anderson, 2000; DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009).
Due to the differences in cognitive load for each question type, the data were analyzed
separately. Although open-ended questions seemed to create higher cognitive loads as
evidenced by findings from the response time analysis (significantly longer response
times for all four scenarios) and this is partially confirmed by the analyzed pupil dilation
(more pupil dilation for half of the scenarios, whereas the other half showed no difference
between question type), the eye movement data provided mixed findings. During the
doctor scenario especially, participants showed significantly greater vertical eye
movements for yes/no questions, whereas their eye movements for the other scenarios
was increased for open-ended questions. This contradicts the assumption that open-ended
questions elicit a higher cognitive load. Possible explanations include the idea that it was
more difficult to answer yes/no questions. For example, during the instructor scenario,
one of the yes/no questions is "Did you miss the test for a good reason?" This question
might have elicited additional cognitive demands. Although participants are aware of
why they missed the test, they may not be ready to classify their reason as good. Another
explanation could be that three of the four scenarios start with yes/no answers and
participants may experience initial problems assuming their malingering role.
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Implications
Human manipulation in the form of malingering has complex sources and
motivations, and has resulted in a waste of financial and human resources. Due to
problems with inaccurate identification of malingering, society continues to be burdened
by individuals who make false claims or exaggerate existing physical or psychological
problems (Mischoulon, 1999; Pollack & Graney, 1984; Singh et al., 2007). One way of
attempting to more accurately expose malingering is the exploration of more objective,
factual data that rely less on clinical experience and judgment than do the traditional
methods of detection. In particular, cognitive research has focused on the differences in
brain functioning when faced with the decision to tell the truth or to deceive (Baker, Stern
& Goldstein, 1990; Gombos, 2006; Phan et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2001; Vrji et al.,
2006; Walczyk et al., 2003, Walczyk et al., 2005., Walczyk et al., 2009; Zuckerman et
al., 1981). Response times, eye movements, and pupil dilation have been measured for
differentiating between liars and truth-tellers (Beatty & Lucerno-Wagoner, 2000; Van
Gerven et al., 2000; Walczyk et al., 2003, Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al., 2009,;
Zuckerman et al., 1981). Furthermore, the differences between response types (yes/no or
open-ended) and their impact on cognitive data have been explained in previous research
(Anderson, 2000; DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009). Other studies have
identified the impact of rehearsing on deceptive responses (DePaulo et al., 2003;
Walczyk et al., 2009).
Findings from the current study suggest that response times differ between
individuals who are asked to tell the truth and individuals who are asked to malinger, and
a significant difference was noted between these two conditions and the rehearsal of
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malingering conditions. None of the eye data was able to significantly differentiate
between the malingering conditions.
Additional measurements that were not part of the hypotheses, and which are
useful for exploratory analysis only, also provided important information. Questions had
been divided into triggering yes/no and open-ended responses. The findings indicate that
cognitive load increases with open-ended questions during the majority of the scenarios.
Response time measures confirmed these assumptions. However, the eye movement data
provided mixed results. Pupil dilation data only partially confirmed the assumption of
cognitive load increasing when a more elaborate response is demanded.
Additional exploratory analysis focused on measuring differences in filler and
inconsistencies by malingering condition. Whereas the analysis of filler did not provide
significant results, inconsistencies were found to be more prevalent for truth-tellers than
for any of the other malingering groups. This may be due to the design of the study. All
malingering conditions are essentially based on pretense, even in the truth-telling group.
Therefore, having more instances of filler may indicate the difficulties individuals had in
remembering the truthful event as previously instructed. Malingerers may feel more
freedom to elaborate in order to make up information according to their malingering
condition, and they may have fewer restrictions that trigger inconsistencies.
Limitations
The current study had a number of limitations that may have influenced its results.
One of the limitations was the participant sample. As frequently experienced in research
within university settings, the sample consisted of a fairly homogeneous group of college
students. Although ranging in age from 18 to 60 years, the average age for this sample
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was 21 years. The majority of the sample was female (70%) and Caucasian-American
(75%). Another limitation with college samples is that their educational level is typically
above the average education of the general population. Therefore, any generalization of
the results must be done with caution.
Another limitation of this research was the actual research design. Although the
experimental conditions were divided into truth-tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and
unrehearsed malingerers, all treatment conditions entailed pretending. In particular,
truth-tellers were not actually responding with an actual truthful response because it was
only the truth they were instructed to remember. The additional demand of searching
memory for the pretend information for each scenario does not reflect the actual
cognitive load of individuals who have to search their memory for factual information
based on their own episodic memory.
Furthermore, the technical aspects of this study may have impacted the results.
Although, Audacity provides various advantages for digitally recording, replaying, and
analyzing auditory data, its indiscriminant recordings and registering of random sounds
may have contributed to inaccurate measurement of the data. Various background noises,
such as moving chairs, opening doors, and coughing were registered as sounds and
manual analysis of the data was necessary in order to determine the actual response
times. Due to background noises, the graphic display of data was inaccurate for recording
the actual end of the question as a beginning point for the response time. Some of the
participants also had filler or premature peeps from the software, such as registering a
cough as the answer. Therefore, manual analysis of the recordings and calculations of
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response times was necessary. Due to the nature of human imprecision and differences in
auditory awareness for sounds, the measured response times might lack precision.
Another limitation of this study is that it had several technical errors that impacted
the data. During the initial part of the study, problems with recording eye data resulted in
18 cases not having any eye data recorded. Other technical problems included questions
that occasionally were omitted resulting in missing data and instructions that were read in
the wrong order during several cases. During those instances, the experimenter had to
redirect participants to the actual instructions for each scenario.
Another problem in the experiment was the impact of noise disturbances during
the study. Not having a soundproof laboratory created various distracting background
noises that may have influenced participants' responses and made it difficult to filter out
the actual responses during the manual transcription and analysis of response times.
Future Research Suggestions
The current experiment analyzed various cognitive cues in order to increase
effectiveness and accuracy for the detection of malingering. However, due to the lack of
an authentic malingering context in which participants were told to actually tell the truth
or malinger, further research may benefit from creating more realistic contexts for
studying malingering. For example, healthy participants could be asked to tell the truth
about their intact health with comparison groups of participants who are instructed to
make up convincing symptoms of non-existing illnesses without the context of preimposed scenarios. This would eliminate the impact of having to search their memory for
information about pretend contexts. Although this does not provide for monitoring
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consistent with the experimental condition, the outcome data may provide significant
findings.
Another research suggestion is to use participants from populations which
represent the general population. University research samples provide various limitations
in order to generalize research findings to the general population. Having a more
heterogeneous sample that is more representative of the U.S. population may change the
outcomes of studies of malingering.
The rehearsed and unrehearsed experimental groups were instructed to make up
feasible responses about non-existing psychological or physical illnesses. Additional
research suggestions are to instruct individuals with actual minor psychological and
physical problems and instruct them to exaggerate. This may reflect the actual problem of
malingering in which individuals suffer from a mild level of distress but report a higher
level in order to gain certain advantages. They may not have to increase their cognitive
load as much as individuals who have to come up with novel information which is not
available in their memory.
Another research suggestion is to monitor the technical aspects of cognitive
studies. The previously discussed technical problems may have contributed to the
inaccuracy of some data. Therefore, multiple measures of response sets in settings free
from disturbances may increase the accuracy of malingering research.
Another suggestion for future research is to sample individuals who admit to
previous incidents of malingering, and to study their motivational factors, preparations
for malingering, and concerns about appearing truthful. This may provide preventive
measures and assist in decreasing instances of malingering.

REFERENCES
Aamodt, M. G., & Custer, H. (2006). Who can best catch a liar?: A meta-analysis of
individual differences in detecting deception. The Forensic Examiner, 15, 6-11.
Ahern, S. K., & Beatty, J. (1979). Physiological signs of information processing vary
with intelligence. Science, 205, 1289-1292.
Albert, S., Fox, H. M , & Kahn, M. W. (1980). Faking psychosis and the Rorschach: Can
expert judges detect malingering? Journal of Personality Assessment, 44, 115-119.
Alvarez, M. C , & Risko, V. J. (1989). Schema activation, construction, and application.
Retrieved on 6/24/2008 from www.ericdigests.org/pre-9213/schema.htm - 23k
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (4l Ed.) Text Revisioa Washington, DC: American Psychiatric
Association.
American Psychological Association. (2002). Ethical principles of psychologists and
code of conduct. American Psychologist, 57, 1060-1073.
American Psychological Association. (2007). APA dictionary of psychology. Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
Anderson, J. R. (2000). Learning and memory. New York: Wiley.
Archer, R. P., & Newsom, C. R. (2000). Psychological test usage with adolescent clients:
Survey update. Assessment, 7, 227-236.
Audacity Source (2009). Audacity Home Page for GSoC 2009. Retrieved on June 2, 2009
from http://www.socghop.appspot.com/org/home/google/gsoc2009/aud.
Back, J., & Oppenheim, C. (2001). A model of cognitive load of IR: Implications for user
relevance feedback interaction. Retrieved on July 22, 2008 from http:// relevance
feedbackinteraction.InformationR.net/ir/6-2/ws2.html
Baddeley, A. D. (1992). Working memory. Science, 255, 556-559. Cited in Walczyk, J. J.,
Mahoney, K. T., Doverspike, D., & Griffith-Ross, D. (2009). Cognitive lie
detection: response time and consistency of answers as cues to deception. Journal
of Business and Psychology, 24, 33-49.
86

87
Bagby, R. M., Marshall, M. B., & Bacchiochi, J. R. (2005). The validity and clinical
utility of the MMPI-2 malingering depression scale. Journal of Personality
Assessment, 85, 304-311.
Bagby, M., Nicholson, R., Bacchiochi, J., Ryder, A., & Bury, B. (2002). Predictive
capacity of the MMPI-2 and PAI validity scales and indexes to detect coached and
uncoached feigning. Journal of Personality Assessment, 69-86.
Bagley, J., & Manelis, L. (1979). Effect of awareness on an indicator of cognitive load.
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 49, 591-594.
Baker, L., Stern, J. A., & Goldstein, R. (1990). The faze control system and the detection
of deception. Rep. No. 90-F131400). For Jackson, South Carolina: Department of
Defense Institute.
Beatty, J. (1982). Task-evoked papillary responses, processing load, and the structure of
processing resources, Psychological Bulletin, 77, 340-355.
Beatty, J., & Lucero-Wagoner, B. (2000). The pupillary system. In Caciappo, J.
Tassinary, L. G., & Bernsten, L. (Eds.) The Handbook of Psychophysiology.
Hillsdale, NJ: Cambridge University Press.
Bernard, L. C , & Fowler, W. (1990). Assessing the validity of memory complaints:
Performance of brain damaged and normal individuals on the Rey's task to detect
malingering. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46, 432-436.
Bolan, B., Foster, J. K., Schmand, B., & Bolan, S. (2002). A comparison of three tests to
detect feigned amnesia: The effects of feedback and the measurement of response
latency. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 24, 154-167.
Bond, C. F., Omar, A., Mahmoud, A., & Bonser, R. N. (1990). Lie detection across
cultures. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 14, 189-204.
Bond, C. F., Omar, A., Pitre, U., & Lashley, B. R. (1992). Fishy-looking liars: Deception
judgment from expectancy violation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
63, 969-977.
Boone, K. B., Savodnik, I., Ghaffarian, S., Lee, A., Freeman, D. (1995). Rey 15-item
memorization and dot counting scores in a "stress" claim worker's compensation
population: Relationship to personality (MCMI) scores. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 51, 457-463.
Boone, K. B., Savodnik, I., Ghaffarian, S., Lee, A., Freeman, D., & Berman, N. G.
(1995). Rey 15-item memorization and dot counting scores in a "stress" claim
worker's compensation population: Relationship to personality scores. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 51, 457-463.

88
Calhoun, P. S., Earnst, K. S., Tucker, D. D., Kirby, A. C , & Beckham, J. C. (2000).
Feigning combat-related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Personality
Assessment Inventory. Journal of Personality Assessment, 75, 338-350.
California Workers' Compensation Institute. (1990). Mental stress claims in California
workers' compensation-incidence, costs, and trends. San Francisco, CA: California
Workers' Compensation Institute.
Camara, W. J., Nathan, J. S., & Puente, A. E. (2000). Psychological test usage:
Implications in professional psychology. Professional Psychology: Research and
Practice, 31, 141-154.
Constantinou, M., & McCaffrey, R. J. (2003). Using the TOMM for evaluating children's
effort to perform optimally on neuropsychological measures. Child
Neuropsychology, 9, 81-90.
Cunnien, A. J. (1997). Psychiatric and medical syndromes associated with deception. In
Rogers R. (Ed.) Clinical assessment of malingering and deception (2nd Ed.). New
York: Guilford Press, 169-207.
DePaulo, B. M , Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Harris,
C. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-112.
DePaulo, B. M , Kashy, D. A., Kiekendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996).
Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 979-995.
DePaulo, B. M., Rosenthal, R., Rosenkrantz, J., & Green, C. R. (1982). Actual and
perceived cues to deception: A closer look at speech. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology, 3, 291-312.
Doherty-Sneddon, G., Burce, V., Bonner, L., Longbotham, S., & Doyle, C. (2002).
Development of gaze aversion as disengagement from visual information.
Developmental Psychology, 38, 438-445.
Doherty-Sneddon, G., & Phelps, F. G. (2005). Gaze aversion: A response to cognitive or
social difficulty? Memory & Cognition, 33, 727-733.
Ekman, P. (2001). Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, politics, and marriage
(3rd ed.), New York: Norton.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception.
Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, 32, 88-106.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., O'Sullivan, M., & Scherer, K. R. (1980). Relative importance
of face, body, and speech in judgments of personality and affect. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 270-277.

89
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., O'Sulllvan, M., & Scherer, K. R. (1991). Invited article: Face,
voice, and body in detecting deceit. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 15, 125-135.
Exner, J. E. (1991). The Rorschach comprehensive system, Vol. 2. Current treatment and
advanced interpretations (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
Exner, J. E. (1997). The future of the Rorschach in personality assessment. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 6$, 37-46.
Fauteck, P. K. (1995). Detecting the malingering of psychosis in offenders: No easy
solutions. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 22, 3-18.
Feldman, M , & Graley, J. (1954). The effects of an experimental set to simulate
abnormality on group Rorschach performance. Journal of Projective Techniques,
18, 326-334.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Friedman, A. F., Lewak, R., Nichols, D. S., & Webb, J. T. (2001). Psychological
assessment with the MMPI-2. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc., Publishers.
Ganellen, R. J., Wasyliw, O. E., Haywood, T. W., & Grossman, L. S. (1996). Can
psychosis be malingered on the Rorschach? An empirical study. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 66, 65-80.
Glenberg, A. M., Schroeder, J. L., & Robertson, D. A. (1998). Averting the gaze
disengages the environment and facilitates remembering, Memory & Cognition, 26,
651-658.
Gombos, V. A. (2006). The cognition of deception: the role of executive processes in
producing lies. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 132, 197214.
Griffin, G. A., Glassmire, D. M., Henderson, E. A., & McCann, C. (1997). Rey II:
Redesigning the Rey Screening Test of Malingering. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 53, 757-766.
Grillo, J., Brown, R. S., Hilsabeck, R., Price, J. R., Lees-Haley, P. R. (1994). Raising
doubts about claims of malingering: Implications of relationships between MCMI-II
and MMPI-2 performances. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 50, 651-655.
Goldberg, J. O., & Millar, H. R. (1986). Performance of psychiatric inpatients and
intellectually deficient individuals on a task that assess the validity of memory
complaints. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 42, 792-795.

90
Granholm, E., Asarnow, R. F., Sarkin, A. J., & Dykes, K. L. (1996). Pupillary responses
index cognitive resource limitations. Psychophysiology, 33, 457-461.
Gravetter, F. J., & Wallnau, L. B. (2004). Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (6th Ed.).
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Groth-Marnat, G. (2003). Handbook of psychological assessment (4th Ed.). Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
Guriel-Tennant, J., & Fremouw, W. (2006). Impact of trauma history and coaching on
malingering of posttraumatic stress disorder using the PAI, TSI, and M-Fast. The
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 17, 577-592.
Haber, A. H., & Fichtenberg, N. L. (2006). Replication of the test of memory malingering
(TOMM) in a traumatic brain injury and head trauma sample. The Clinical
Neuropsychologist, 20, 524-532.
Hathaway, S. R., & McKinley, J. C. (1940). A multiphasic personality schedule
(Minnesota): I. Construction of the schedule. Journal of Psychology, 10, 249-254.
Hays, W.L. (1994). Statistics (5th Ed.). Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace.
Heinze, M. (2003). Developing sensitivity to distortion: utility of psychological tests in
differentiating malingering and psychopathology in criminal defendants. The
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 14, 151-177.
Holden R., Kroner D., Fekken G., & Popham S. (1992). A model of personality test item
response dissimulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 272-279.
Hopwood, C. J., Morey, L. C , Rogers, R., & Sewell, K. (2007). Malingering on the
Personality Assessment Inventory: Identification of specific feigned disorders.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 88, 43-48.
Kelly, P. J., Baker, G. A., van den Broek, M. D., Jackson, H., & Humphries, G. (2005).
The detection of malingering in memory performance: The sensitivity and pecificity
of four measures in the UK population. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44,
33-341.
Kimberely, T. J., Lewis, S. M., Strand, C , Rice, B. D., Hall, S., & Slivinik, P. (2008).
Neural substrates of cognitive load changed during a motor task in subjects with
stroke. Journal of Neurologic Physical Therapy, 32, 110-117.
Krings, A. M., Davison, G. C , Neale, J. M., & Johnson, S .L. (2007). Abnormal
Psychology (10th Ed.). Wiley: Hoboken, NJ.

91
Lally, S. (2003). What tests are acceptable for use in forensic evaluations? A survey of
experts. Professional Psychology: Research & Practice, 34, 491-498.
Leng, N. R., &Parkin, A. J. (1995). The detection of exaggerated or simulated memory
disorder by neuropsychological methods. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 6,
767-776.
Lasky, H. (1980). California worker's compensation laws: A threat and challenge.
California Western Law Review, 17, 1-25.
Lees-Haley, P. R. (1997). MMPI-2 base rates for 492 personal injury plaintiffs:
Implications and challenges for forensic assessment. Journal of Clinical Psychology
53, 745-755.
Liljequist, L., Kinder, B. N, & Schinka, J. A. (1998). An investigation of malingering
posttraumatic stress disorder on the Personality Assessment Inventory. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 71, 322-336.
Lo Piccolo, C. J., Goodkin, K., & Baldewicz, T. (1999). Current issues in the diagnosis
and management of malingering. Annals of Medicine, 31, 166-174.
Marcus, E. H. (1983). Causation in psychiatry: Realities and speculations. Medical Trial
Technical Quality, 29, 424-433.
May, J. G., Kennedy, R. S., Williams, M. C , Dunlap, W. P., & Brannan, J. R. (1990).
Eye movement indices of mental workload. Acta Psychologica, 75, 75-89.
Meisner, S. (1988). Susceptibility of Rorschach distress correlates to malingering.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 52, 564-571.
Millon, Theodore (with Roger D. Davis) (1996) Disorders of Personality: DSMTVand
Beyond (2nd Ed.), New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Mischoulon, D. (1999). An approach to the patient seeking psychiatric disability benefits.
Academic Psychiatry, 23, 128-136.
Mittenberg, W., Patton, C , Canyock, E. M., & Condit, D. C. (2002). Base rates of
malingering and symptom exaggeration. Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Psychology, 24, 1094-1102.
Morey, L. C. (1991). Personality Assessment Inventory: Professional manual. Tampa,
FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
O'Bryant, S. E., Enger,. L. R., Kleiner, J. S., Vasterling, J. J., & Black, F. W. (2007). Test
of Memory Malingering (TOMM) trail 1 as a screening measure for insufficient
effort. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 21, 511-521.

92
O'Bryant, S. E., & Lucas, J. A. (2006). Estimating the predictive value of the test of
memory malingering: An illustrative example for clinicians. The Clinical
Neuropsychologist, 20, 533-540.
Orsini, D. L., Van Gorp, W. G., Boone, K. B. (1988). The neuropsychological casebook.
New York: Springer.
O'Sullivan, M. (2003). The fundamental attribution error in detecting deception: The
Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,
1316-1327.
O'Sullivan, M , Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Scherer, K. R. (1985). What you say and
how you say it: The contribution of speech content and voice quality to judgments
of others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 54-62.
O'Sullivan, M., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1988). The effect of comparisons on
detecting deceit. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 12, 203-215.
Phan, K. L., Magalhaes, A., Ziemlewicz, T. J., Fitzgerald, D. A., Green, C , & Smith, W.
(2005). Neural correlates of telling lies: a functional magnetic resonance imaging
study at 4 Tesla. Academic Radiology, 12, 164-172.
Pollack, D. R., & Grainey, T. F. (1984). A comparison of MMPI profiles for state and
private disability insurance applicants. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 121125.
Pollock, P. (1998). Feigning auditory hallucinations by offenders. The Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry, 9, 305-327.
Powell, M., Geller, J., Oliveri, M , Stanton, S., & Hendricks, B. (2004). Rey AVLT serial
position effect: A useful indicator of symptom exaggeration? Clinical
Neuropsychologist, 18, 465-476.
Resnick, P. J. (1984). The detection of malingered mental illness. Behavioral Sciences &
the Law, 2,21-38.
Resnick, R. (1997). Malingered psychosis. In R. Rogers (Ed.), Clinical assessment of
malingering and deception (2nd ed.). (pp. 47-67). New York: Guilford.
Resnick, P. J. (1999). The detection of malingered psychosis. Psychiatric Clinical North
America, 22, 159-172.
Rey, A. (1964). L 'examen clinique en psychologie [The clinical examination in
psychology]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

93
Riggio, R. E., Salinas, C , & Tucker, J. (1988). Personality and deception ability.
Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 189-191.
Rogers, R. (1997). Researching dissimulation. In R. Rogers (ed.), Clinical assessment of
malingering and deception (2nd ed.). New York: Guildford Press.
Rogers, R., Gillis, J. R., Dickens, S. E., & Bagby, R. M. (1991). Standardized assessment
of malingering: Validation of the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms.
Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 3, 8996.
Rogers, R., Sewell, K. W., Martin, M. A., & Vitacco, M. J. (2003). Detection of feigned
mental disorders: A meta-analysis of the MMPI-2 and malingering. Assessment, 10,
160-177.
Rogers, R., Sewell, K. W., Morey, L. C , & Ustad, K. L. (1996). Detection of feigned
mental disorders on the Personality Assessment Inventory: A discriminant analysis.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 67, 629-640.
Rogers, R., Ustad, K. L., & Salekin, K. T. (1997). Convergent validity of the Personality
Assessment Inventory: A study of emergency referrals in a correctional setting.
Assessment, 5, 3-12.
Rorschach, H. (1964). Psychodiagnostics. New York: Grune & Stratton. (Original work
published in German in 1921).
Rosen, J., Mulsant, B. H., Bruce, M. L., Mittal, V., & Fox, D. (2004). Actors' portrayal
of depression to test interrater reliability in clinical trials. American Journal of
Psychiatry, 161, 1909-1911. Cited in Samuel, R. Z., & Mittenberg, W. (2005).
Determination of malingering in disability evaluations. Primary Psychiatry, 12, 6068.
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social
psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rubenzer, S. (2004). Malingering of psychiatric disorders and cognitive impairment in
criminal court settings. Retrieved on 2/28/2008 from
http://www.steverubenzerphd.com/Mainginering_CRIM.asp.
Samuel, R. Z., & Mittenberg, W. (2005). Determination of malingering in disability
evaluations. Primary Psychiatry, 12, 60-68.
Schagen, S., Schmand, B., de Sterke, S., & Lindeboom, J. (1997). Amsterdam ShortTerm Memory Test: A new procedure for the detection of feigned memory deficits.
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 19, 43-51.

94
Seamons, D. T., Howell, R. J., Carlisle, A. L., & Roe, A. V. (1981). Rorschach
simulation of mental illness and normality by psychotics and non-psychotic legal
offenders. Journal of Personality Assessment, 45, 130-135.
Seymour, T. L., Seifert, C. M., Shafto, M. G., & Mosman, A. L. (2000) Using response
time measures to access "guilty knowledge". Journal of Applied Psychology, 85,
30-37.
Simon, M. J. (1994). The use of the Rey Memory Test to assess malingering in criminal
defendants. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 50, 913-917.
Singh, J., Avasthi, A., & Grover, S. (2007). Malingering of psychiatric disorders: A
review. German Journal of Psychiatry, 10, 126-132.
Spence, S. A. (2008). Playing devil's advocate: The case against fMRI lie detection.
Legal and Criminological Psychology, 13, 11-25.
Spence S. A., Farrow T. F. D., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., Zheng, Y., Woodruff, P.
W. R. (2001). Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in
humans. Neuroreport: For Rapid Communication of Neuroscience Research, 12,
2849-2853.
Steffan, J. S., Clopton, J. R., & Morgan, R. D. (2003). A MMPI-2 scale to detect
malingered depression (Md.). Assessment, 10, 328-392.
Sumanti, M., Boone, K. B., Savodnik, I., & Gorsuch, R. (2006). Noncredible psychiatric
and cognitive symptoms in a workers' compensation "stress" claim sample. The
Clinical Neuropsychologist, 20, 754-765.
Taylor, L., Kreutzer, J., & West, D., (2003). Evaluation of malingering cut-off scores for
the Rey 15-Item Test: A brain injury case study series. Brain Injury, 17, 295-308.
Teplin, L. (1990). Detecting disorder: The treatment of mental illness among jail
detainees. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 58, 233-236.
Tombaugh, T. N. (1996). Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM). New York: MultiHealth Systems, Inc.
Underwood, G., Jebbett, L., & Roberts, K. (2004). Inspecting pictures for information to
verify a sentence: Eye movements in general encoding and in focused search. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 57, 165-182.
Van Gerven, P. W. M., Paas, F., Van Merrienboer, J. J. G., & Schmidt, H. (2004).
Memory load and the cognitive pupillary response in aging, Psychophysiology, 41,
167-174.

95
Vendemia, J. M. C , Buzan, R. F., & Green, E. P. (2005). Practice effects, workload, and
reaction time in deception. The American Journal of Psychology, 118, 413-429.
Vendemia, J. M. C , Buzan, R. F., & Simon-Dack, S. L. (2005). Reaction time of motor
responses in two-stimulus paradigms involving deception and congruity with
varying levels of difficulty. Behavioural Neurology, 16, 25-36.
Vitacco, M , Rogers, R., Gabel, J., & Munizza, J. (2007). An evaluation of malingering
screens with competency to stand trial patients: A known-groups comparison. Law
and Human Behavior, 31, 249-260.
Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities (2n ed.). New York,
NY: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., Leal, S. (2006). Detecting deception by manipulating
cognitive load. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 141-142.
Walczyk, J. J., Roper, K. S., Seeman, E., Humphreys, A. M. (2003). Cognitive
mechanisms underlying lying to questions: Response time as a cue to deception.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 755-77'4.
Walczyk, J. J., Schwartz, J. P., Clifton, R., Adams, B., Wei, M., & Zha, P. (2005). Lying
person to person about life events: A cognitive framework for lie detection.
Personnel Psychology, 58, 141-170.
Walczyk, J. J., Mahoney, K. T., Doverspike, D., & Griffith-Ross, D. (2009). Cognitive lie
detection: response time and consistency of answers as cues to deception. Journal
of Business and Psychology, 24, 33-49.
Wang, E. W., Rogers, R., Giles, C. L., Diamond, P. M., Herrington-Wang, L. E., Taylor,
E. R. (1997). A pilot study of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) in
corrections: Assessment of malingering, suicide risk, and aggression in male
inmates. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 15, 469-482.
Wetter, M. W., & Corrigan, S. K. (1995). Providing information to clients about
psychological tests: A survey of attorneys' and law students' attitudes. Professional
Psychology: Research and Practice, 26, 474-477.
Wetter, M. W., Baer, R. A., Berry, D., Smith, G. T., & Larsen, L. H. (1992). Sensitivity
of MMPI-2 validity scales to random responding and malingering. Psychological
Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 4, 369-374.
Wright, P., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Evidence for alternative strategies of sentence
retention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 23, 197-213.

96
Youngjohn, J. R. (1995). Confirmed attorney coaching prior to neuropsychological
evaluations. Assessment, 2, 279-283.
Zebrowitz, L. A., Voinescu, L., & Collins, M. A. (1996). "Wide-eyed" and "crookedfaced": Determinants of perceived and real honesty across the life span. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1258-1269.
Ziskin, J. (1984). Malingering of psychological disorders. Behavioral Sciences & the
Law, 2, 39-49.
Zuckerman, M , DeFrank, R. S. Hall, J. A., Larrance, D. T., & Rosenthal, R. (1979).
Facial and vocal cues of deception and honesty. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 15, 378-396.
Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and nonverbal
communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental
Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press.
Zuckerman, M , & Driver, R. E. (1985). Telling lies: Verbal and nonverbal correlates of
deception. In W.A. Siegman & S. Feldstein (Eds.), Multichallenge integration of
nonverbal behavior (pp. 129-147). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Zuckerman, M., Koestner, R., Colella, M. J., & Alton, A. O. (1984). Anchoring in the
detection of deception and leakage. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
47, 301-311.

APPENDIX A
HUMAN USE COMMITTEE APPROVAL FORM

98

Human Use Committee Review
DEPARTMENT HEAD APPROVAL FORM

TO:

Project Directors

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, Office of University Research
bta 1 bot@latech. ed u
318-257-5075 phone
318-257-5079 fax
http://research.latech.edu/

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

June 2008

Please submit this page signed by your Department Head or Dean when submitting a
proposal to the Human Use Committee for expedited approval. Their signature is stating
that they are aware of this proposal and/or survey that is being conducted.
(print or type below)
Department
Psychology & Behavioral Sciences

Department Head Name

Tilman Sheets

Signature
(Actual original signature required)

Date
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Do you plan to publish this study?
XYES

DNO

Will this study be published by a national organization?
DYES X NO
COMMENTS:

STUDY/PROJECT INFORMATION FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE
Describe your study/project in detail for the Human Subjects Committee.
Please include the following information.
TITLE: Detecting Malingering via Cognitive Cues to Deception
PROJECT DIRECTOR(S): Birgit Smart, Jeffrey J. Walczyk, Mary-Ann
Goodwyn, Tony Young
EMAIL: bms013@latech.edu
PHONE: 318-257-4315
DEPARTMENT(S): Psychology and Behavioral Sciences
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To test and refine cognitive cues to
deception that may differ in individuals who malinger with or without rehearsal
from truth tellers. The cognitive cues are eye gaze (focus), response time, and
pupil dilation. Results of this study might contribute to the development of more
reliable and precise indicators that inform about a person's veracity when
incentives for malingering are present.
PARTICIPANTS: About 90 undergraduate and graduate students of Louisiana
Tech University
PROCEDURE: Participants will be asked to participate in one experiment in
which they will either malinger without rehearsal, malinger with rehearsal, or tell
the truth. The experiment will involve imagined scenarios which are possible
situations that can happen in students' lives. Students will be asked to adopt the
role of each scenario and answer questions. Eye tracking technology will be used
to assess eye movement data, such as pupil dilation and gaze. Response time
will also be collected from each participant. Specifically, a camera mounted in
front of each participant during individual testing will rapidly take pictures of
his/her eyes. Recordings will allow researchers to assess what participants are
looking at on a computer screen. Recordings will later be scored for retinal

dilation, gaze aversion, and other indices thought to be correlated with the act of
malingering.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OR OTHER CHANGES by
IRB Committee
1. How and where will subjects be recruited?
Subjects will be recruited from undergraduate and graduate psychology classes
at Louisiana Tech University.
What will they be told?
They will be told that the goal of the study is to identify cognitive cues of
deception that differ between truth tellers, rehearsed malingerers, and
unrehearsed malingerers. The students will be told that their eye movements,
such as gaze and dilation, and response time will be measured. NO
DECEPTION WILL BE INVOLVED IN THIS EXPERIMENT REGARDING ITS
PURPOSE OF SCOPE.
Who will recruit?
Recruiting will be conducted by Birgit Smart or Dr. Walczyk, that is, by one of the
co-investigators of this project.
Will there be alternative extra credit?
Yes, the instructors in the classes where the option to participate will be
announced will make extra credit assignments available to students who do not
wish to participate in this experiment. The alternative activity will be designed by
instructors and will consist of doing an educational task that will take an
equivalent amount of time as participation in the experiment.
2. You can see below that a declaration has been added to the procedure
section of the Consent Form that questions may be asked about which
students are not prone to be frank.
3. Will anyone encounter potentially embarrassing scenarios?
Yes, the experimenter who serves in the role of the lie detection examiner will
hear answers to potentially embarrassing questions. He or she, however, will not
know if the participant has been assigned to a condition in which answers given
are truthful or deceptive. Moreover, all experimenters will be warned that all
answers given are strictly for research purposes and should in no way be shared
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with others or used to evaluate the participant at any time in the future. Of
course, participants will be play acting, not disclosing personal truths.

INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES TO INSURE PROTECTION OF
CONFIDENTIALITY, ANONYMITY: The ISCAN camera eye trackers (please
see attached) will be used to assess eye movements. Moreover, a
microphone headset will be worn by participants to measure response latencies.
Answers will be digitally recorded. Names will NOT be used in any of the
analyses or publications that will result from this research. Specifically, subject
numbers, rather than names, will be used to track and compile all participants'
data. Only aggregated group data will be reported.

RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: There is a risk that participants will be
made uncomfortable having to pretend to malinger because of their religious or
moral beliefs. Moreover, they may be apprehensive that their answers will be
used to evaluate them. With the consent of instructors, students not wishing to
participate in research will be offered an alternative means of obtaining extra
credit such as summarizing a journal article (see benefits and compensations
below).
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: Students will receive extra credit points from
their instructors in exchange for participation. In addition, students will learn what
it is like to participate in a psychological experiment.
SAFEGUARDS OF PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING: To minimize
the aforementioned risks, participants will be assured that they may withdrawal
from research anytime and that their anonymity will be protected. If any students
are made to feel uncomfortable, they will be referred to the Louisiana Tech
University Counseling Services located in 310 Keeney Hall, phone: 318-2572488 or to Mary Livingston or Les Guice as specified on the informed consent
form.

Note: Use the Human Subjects Consent form to briefly summarize
information about the study/project to participants and obtain their
permission to participate.

102

Human Subjects Consent Form

The following is a brief summary of the project in which you are asked to
participate. Please read this information before signing the statement
below.
TITLE OF PROJECT: Response Time, Pupil Dilation, and Eye Movements:
Cognitive and Physiological Cues to Deception
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To extend, refine, and test further the
Activation-Decision-Construction Model of Malingering and to develop further
cognitive cues to deception, including response time, pupil dilation, and eye
responses. Combined, these cues may eventually lead to a viable method for
detecting malingering.
PROCEDURE: Participants will be asked to be involved in one of a series of
experiments in which they will either tell the truth to questions about physical or
psychological issues, fake psychological or physical problems (malinger) without
the opportunity to rehearse or malingering with time for rehearsing their
response. SOME OF THE QUESTIONS MAY INVOLVE TOPICS ABOUT
WHICH MANY UNDERGRADUATES ARE NOT PRONE TO BE FRANK. The
experiments may involve imagined scenarios during which malingering (faking or
exaggerating) psychological or physical problems might lead to beneficial
outcomes in terms of getting away with something or having financial benefits.
Eye tracking technology will be used to monitor and record eye movement data.
Responses will be recorded for subsequent coding.
INSTRUMENTS: ISCAN eye tracking technology will be used to assess eye
movement data.
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: There is a risk that you might be made
uncomfortable having to malinger because of their religious or moral beliefs.
Moreover, you might feel some embarrassment of questions to be asked. With
the consent of instructors, students not wishing to participate in research will be
offered an alternative means of obtaining extra credit such as summarizing a
research article from a scholarly journal.
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: You will receive extra credit points from
instructors in exchange for participation. In addition, you will learn what it is like
to participate in a psychological experiment, the methods used by psychologists,
and so forth.
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I,
, attest with my signature that I have read and
understood
the
following
description
of
the
study,
"
", and its purposes and methods.
I
understand that my participation in this research is strictly voluntary and
my participation or refusal to participate in this study will not affect my
relationship with Louisiana Tech University or mv grades in any way.
Further, I understand that I may withdraw at any time or refuse to answer
any questions without penalty. Upon completion of the study, I understand
that the results will be freely available to me upon request. I understand
that the results of my survey will be confidential, accessible only to the
principal investigators, myself, or a legally appointed representative. I
have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any of my rights related to
participating in this study.

Signature of Participant or Guardian

Date

CONTACT INFORMATION: The principal experimenters listed below may
be reached to
answer questions about the research, subjects' rights, or related matters.
Birgit Smart
Phone: 318-257-4315

or Jeffrey J. Walczyk
Phone: 318-257-3004

Members of the Human Use Committee of Louisiana Tech University may
also be contacted if a problem cannot be discussed with the
experimenters:
Dr. Les Guice (257-3056)
Dr. Mary M. Livingston (257-2292 or 257-4315)
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Ms. Birgit Smart, Dr. Walczyk, Dr. Mary-Ann Goodwyn, and Dr. Tony Young

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

September 16, 2008

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:
"Detecting Malingering Via Cognitive Cues to Deception"
# HUC-596
The proposed study's revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy of the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part of the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval
of the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on September 4, 2008 and
this project will need to receive a continuation revieyv by the IRB if the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond September 4, 2009. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office of University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct of the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion of the study. If changes occur
in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315.
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Please respond to the following demographic items by filling in the blanks or circling the
most fitting response.
1. Gender:

Male

Female

2. Age:

years, months

3. Ethnicity/Race:

4. Religion

African-American

Caucasian-American

Native-American

Latina/Latino/Hispanic

Asian-American

Other (Please specify):

Atheist

Jewish

Buddhist

Muslim

Christian

Hindi

Other (please specify):
1. What is your present student classification (year in school)?
Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Other (please specify)
6.
7.
8.
9.

Current major (please specify)
Marital Status
Single
What is your native language?
What is your secondary language:

Married

Graduate Student

APPENDIX C
CODING FORMS WITH PAIRS
OF INTERRELATED QUESTIONS
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Questions for Scenario 1

Assume that the questions are being asked by your doctor. Answer them as you
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.

o

How are you feeling today?

o

Are you suffering from any type of pain? (Al )*

o

Do you currently experience any problems from the fall at work?

o How does your back feel right now? (A2)*
o Are you able to move around without pain and continue your work?
o

Do you need to stay at home for additional time to heal? (CI)*

o Are you ready to return to work? (B1 )*
o Do you think you would experience any pain if you were to go back to work right
now? (B2)*
o

How much more time do you think you need in order to heal? (C2)*

* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair.

109
Questions for Scenario 2

Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor in her office.
Answer them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.

o

Did you miss the test for a good reason? Al *

o What was your reason? A2*
o

Were you sick? B1 *

o Why didn't you call me?
o What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness? B2*
o Where were you during the exam? C1 *
o What were you doing?
o Were you able to come to class on the day of the exam? C2*

* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair.
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Questions for Scenario 3

Assume that the questions are asked by a disability examiner. Answer them as you
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.

o Are you suffering from depression at this time? Al *
o Have you experienced any improvements in your mood lately? A2*
o How is your energy level now? B1 *
o Do you still have any problems with memory?
o Are you easily fatigued? B2*
o How is your concentration?
o

Do you think you can go back to work at this time? CI *

o Does your depression currently make it difficult to perform your job? C2*
o Do you feel that you are so sick that you still need disability payments?

* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair.
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Questions for Scenario 4

Assume that the judge is asking the questions.

o You were involved in a car accident. What suffering did you have from the
accident? Al*
o Did you receive any bodily injuries? B1 *
o Did you feel any pain after the accident? A2*
o What were your bodily injuries? B2*
o Did you experience any psychological distress?
o Do you believe that you should receive monetary damages beyond the costs of
replacing your car?
o Where have you felt pain? CI *
o How does your neck feel since the accident? C2*
o Do you have any problems moving your neck?

* Letter/Number combinations show questions monitoring for consistency, e.g., Al and
A2 are constitute a question consistency pair.

APPENDIX D
SCENARIOS AND RELATED QUESTIONS
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Scenario 1
Please adopt the role of a salesperson at a large department store who has
been home on sick pay for the past two weeks after an accident at work.
Specifically, you slipped and hurt your back slightly. It is really time for
you to return to work because your injury has healed completely. You
have experienced no problems in the past few days. You feel great and
suffer from no type of physical pain. You have another appointment with
your physician who will decide whether you should stay at home and use
your sick time or go back to work.

Questions for Scenario 1
Assume that the questions are being asked by your doctor. Answer them as you
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.
o

How are you feeling today?

o

Are you suffering from any type of pain? (Al)*

o

Do you currently experience any problems from the fall at work?

o

How does your back feel right now? (A2)*

o

Are you able to move around without pain and continue your work?

o

Do you need to stay at home for additional time to heal? (CI)*

o Are you ready to return to work? (Bl)*
o

Do you think you would experience any pain if you were to go back to work right
now? (B2)*

o

How much more time do you think you need in order to heal? (C2)*
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Scenario 2
You just missed a major test in your 8:00 AM English 102 Composition
class because you overslept. Your professor, a tough-minded individual,
will only excuse you for genuine illness. Otherwise you will get an "F" for
the missed exam and most likely for the course. It is past the drop date.
Your financial aid and your goal of a high GPA for graduation are at risk
unless you are able to convince your professor that you can make up this
test. You have an appointment in her office at 2:00 PM, hopefully to
convince her to make up the exam.

Questions for Scenario 2
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor in her office.
Answer them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.

o Did you miss the test for a good reason?
o What was your reason?
o Were you sick?
o Why didn't you call me?
o What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness?
o Where were you during the exam?
o What were you doing?
o Were you able to come to class on the day of the exam?

115

Scenario 3
Approximately six months ago you suffered from severe depression which
made it impossible for you to work in your dead-end job. Your depression
made you feel weak, tired, and unable to enjoy anything at that time. You
also had problems concentrating and remembering things. Your
depression made it impossible for you to work so you slept all day long.
Your work consists of standing on an assembly line in a chicken plant
every day where you sort the chicken parts into bags of wings and drum
sticks, a really boring and disgusting job. You decided to claim disability
for a chronic depressive disorder at that time but have since fully
recovered and are able to return to work. You have energy and enjoy life
again. The appointment for your disability examination is scheduled today
and you will be asked questions about your psychological condition.
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Questions for Scenario 3
Assume that the questions are asked by a disability examiner. Answer them as you
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.

o Are you suffering from depression at this time?
o

Have you experienced any improvements in your mood lately?

o How is your energy level now?
o Do you still have any problems with memory?
o Are you easily fatigued?
o

How is your concentration?

o Do you think you can go back to work at this time?
o Does your depression currently make it difficult to perform your job?
o Do you feel that you are so sick that you still need disability payments?
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Scenario 4
You drove your 1999 Toyota Corolla three weeks ago on campus when
this big Mercedes came out from a side road in reckless disregard of your
car and your right away. The car hit you, totaled your Corolla, but did not
cause you any physical injuries. Immediately after the accident happened,
the driver of the Mercedes jumped out, yelled at you for not stopping on
time, and did not ask you if you were okay or if you needed help. Later,
you overhead him talking to his wife on his cell phone saying that a
"jackass college kid ran into me." He creates difficulties for you,
requesting his insurance to check your role in the accident very carefully
and not pay for your totaled car. You finally have a court date and the
judge is going to ask you questions about your psychological and physical
well-being resulting from the accident.
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Questions for Scenario 4
Assume that the judge is asking the questions. Answer them as you were instructed
outside and as quickly as possible.

o You were involved in a car accident. What suffering did you have from the
accident?
o Did you receive any bodily injuries?
o

Did you feel any pain after the accident?

o What were your bodily injuries?
o

Did you experience any psychological distress?

o Do you believe that you should receive monetary damages beyond the costs of
replacing your car?
o Where have you felt pain?
o

How does your neck feel since the accident?

o Do you have any problems moving your neck?

APPENDIX E
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

Debriefing Statement

The purpose of this study is to test if individuals who make up deceptive statements
according to the role they have been assigned in hypothetical scenarios display
differences in pupil dilation, eye gaze, and response time when compared with
individuals who are asked to respond with the truth according to the role they have
been assigned in the same hypothetical scenarios.
Previous research in lie detection has shown that individuals differ in response time
depending on whether they tell the truth, rehearse their lies before answering, and
lie without rehearsal. Furthermore focused eye gaze differs between these three
categories. Pupil dilation also differs between individuals who are allowed to
rehearse their lies, unrehearsed liars, and truth tellers.
This study focuses in particular on measuring the above cognitive cues to deception
within the context of malingering, e.g. faking bad. The purpose of this research is to
explore ways for more accurate identification of individuals who malinger.
As we have informed you before, your identity and response to questions will be
kept private. Your answers were recorded under your participant number instead
of your name or other identifiers in order to assure your confidentiality. Likewise, it
is important that you do not reveal information concerning your participation in
this experiment or other characteristics of the experiment itself because discussing
this study with others could affect the data of other future participants. Revealing
information about the experiment might result in inaccurate results and hurt the
scientific value of the study. Your participation has not only allowed you to learn
about the experimental procedure but also let you to increase your understanding of
the psychological factors mentioned above that were tested in this study. Thank you
for helping to advance the field of cognitive psychology.
For any questions about your participation in this experiment, please contact one of
the following researchers.

Birgit Smart
bmsO 13@latech.edu

or

Jeffrey J. Walczyk
Woodard Hall, Room 114-E
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Instructions for Greeters for the Malingering Experiment
Please proceed in the following order:
1. Welcome the participant to the study and make sure that the person showing
up has actually an appointment on the sign-up schedule.
o

If participants show up promptly, start testing right away. You do not have
to wait until the scheduled time.

o

If participants do not show up on time, call their listed number right away
reminding them that they are scheduled and see if they can come within
the next 10 minutes.

o DO NOT LEAVE OUT ANY PARTICIPANT NUMBERS AND
ALWAYS GO IN THE ORDER OF THE SHEET. ASSIGN NUMBERS
IN THE ORDER PARTICIPANTS ARE SHOWING UP FOR THE
STUDY.
o

Example: Joe is unable to come for his 9:00 am appointment and he would
have been Participant Number 10, Jane who shows up for her 9:30 am
appointment will be Participant Number 10.

2. Obtain informed consent for the experiment.
o

Provide participants with written informed consent and a pen and ask them
if they have any questions.

o If they agree to the conditions of the study and want to participate, let
them sign the sign-in sheet.
o Ask participants to fill out the sign in sheet. Remind them to print their
names legibly in order for them to receive their extra credit.
3. Check the sign-in sheet in order to determine what condition participant is in
(right column, e.g., A, B, or C).
o Administer the malingering condition instructions according to
participant's assigned condition.
o Example: if Joe is in condition A, look in the folder with "Condition A
Procedure" and follow the instructions for greeters by providing the
"Condition A Instructions for Participants" to the participant for reading
along while you read your instructions verbatim.

o

After you and participants are finished with the reading, place the greeter
and participant instructions back into their correct folder in order to avoid
confusion.

4. Escort the participant to the examiner in the eye-tracking laboratory.
o

Introduce each participant to the examiner by stating participant's number
and experimental condition.

o

Example: "This is Joe, number 30, and he is in condition A."

5. After the eye-tracking session, the examiner will escort participant back to
you.
o

Have participants read the debOriefing statement and thank them for
participating in this experiment.

APPENDIX G
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXAMINERS
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Instructions for Examiners for the Malingering Experiment
Please proceed in the following order:
1. Make sure that you obtain participant number and experimental condition
for each participant from the greeter.
2. Administer the malingering instructions (spoken task) next.
o

Make sure that your malingering instruction (condition A, B, or C) matches
the participant's assigned malingering condition.

3. For this experiment, the audacity file recordings are needed. Audacity file
names should be AUD800. AUD801, etc. Begin recording after the practice
item. Pause except during questions.
4. The computer will display the random order of the scenarios, e.g., 1,3,4,2.
This provides you with the information you need in order to give correct
handouts to the participants. Each scenario, including the practice one, is on
a separate handout. Read each scenario aloud so the participant can follow
along. Read slowly and clearly.
o

Example: Joe comes in, receives a handout for the practice scenario, undergoes
calibration, receives the supplemental instructions, and answers the questions
accordingly. Next handout the next scenario, review of scenario, chin on headrest,
and answers, etc.

o All scenarios have a number on the left hand top corner of the page.
5. For hygienic purposes, place a fresh tissue on the chinrest before asking each
participant to put their chin on the device.
6. Calibrate the eye tracker.
o

Instruct each participant to remain as still as possible.

o

One of your main tasks is to keep the eye tracker calibrated throughout the
session.

o

After running through the practice item, turn on the eye tracking recorder.

o

Save each participant's eye data file under EYE and participant's number. For
example, participant number 800 is EYE800, etc.
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o Put headphones on the participant's ears so that the attached microphone is
close to the participant's mouth.
o

For the Malingering Experiment, the response time file will have the file name
LIE and participant's number. For example, participant number 801 will be
saved under LIE801, etc.

o

Run through the practice questions with the participants, reminding them to
answer quickly.

o After the practice items, begin recording data with the beginning of the actual
malingering scenarios. Use the eye tracker by clicking on the appropriate key.
Following the last question, end recording and use the eye tracker by clicking
on the appropriate key. SAVE THE DATA BY NAMING SYSTEM NOTED
ABOVE.
7. Explain to participants that they are done with this part of the study and
return them to the greeter. A debriefing statement will follow.

SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION A
See Handout for CONDITION A for instructions.

SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION B
See Handout for CONDITION B for instructions.

SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION C
See Handout for CONDITION C for instructions.
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Condition A Procedure

Instructions to be followed by the greeter:
Hand a copy of these instructions to the participant so that he or she can follow along as
you READ ALOUD slowly and clearly to the participant. Afterward, ask the participant
to summarize the instructions in his or her own words. Verify his or her understanding.

For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and
prevent others from hearing the questions you are being asked. The
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to
truthfulness or deception.
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene.
Please answer all questions honestly, consistently, and as quickly as
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh"
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all
questions TRUTHFULLY according to the role you are asked to adopt
and with nothing but the truth, speaking only the information necessary
to answer the question. All information will be kept strictly confidential
and anonymous.
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do?
{Offer corrective feedback or clarification as needed.)
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Condition A Instructions for Participant

For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and
prevent others from hearing the questions you are being asked. The
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to
truthfulness or deception.
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene.
Please answer all questions honestly, consistently, and as quickly as
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh"
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all
questions TRUTHFULLY according to the role you are asked to adopt
and with nothing but the truth, speaking only the information necessary
to answer the question. All information will be kept strictly confidential
and anonymous.
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do?

Condition B Procedure

Instructions to be followed by the greeter:
Hand a copy of these instructions to the participant so that he or she can follow along as
you READ ALOUD slowly and clearly to the participant. Afterward, ask the participant
to summarize the instructions in his or her own words. Verify his or her understanding.

For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to
truthfulness or deception.
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios on you will adopt
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene.
Please answer all questions deceptively, consistently, and as quickly as
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh"
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all
questions ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the
role you are asked to adopt. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE
CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT THE LIES YOU
PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER. All information
will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous.
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do?
{Offer corrective feedback or clarification as needed.)

Condition B Instructions for Participant

For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to
truthfulness or deception.
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios on you will adopt
various roles. After each, a series of questions will be posed. While
answering, keep your eyes focused on the landscape. You may look at
any part of the landscape, but try not to look away from the scene.
Please answer all questions deceptively, consistently, and as quickly as
possible. Avoid throat clearing and irrelevant utterances, such as "uh"
and "ah." Please remove any items from your mouth, such as gum or
candy, before entering the room. As a final reminder, please answer all
questions ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the
role you are asked to adopt. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE
CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT THE LIES YOU
PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER. All information
will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous.
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do?
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Condition C Procedure

Instructions to be followed by the greeter:
Hand a copy of these instructions to the participant so that he or she can follow along as
you READ ALOUD slowly and clearly to the participant. Afterward, ask the participant
to summarize the instructions in his or her own words. Verify his or her understanding.

For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to
truthfulness or deception.
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt
various roles. After each, a series of questions dealing with this scenario
will be posed. While answering, keep your eyes focused on the
landscape. You may look at any part of the landscape, but try not to
look away from the scene. Please answer all questions deceptively,
consistently, and as quickly as possible. Avoid throat clearing and
irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" and "ah." Please remove any items
from your mouth, such as gum or candy, before entering the room. As a
final reminder, please answer all questions ANSWER ALL
QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the role you are asked to adopt.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE
SURE THAT THE LIES YOU PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT
ONE ANOTHER. All information will be kept strictly confidential and
anonymous.
Prior to testing, you will be given a copy of the questions so you can
rehearse your lies before the questions are being asked. Try to prepare
believable and consistent lies during rehearsal time.
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do?
(Offer corrective feedback or clarification as needed)
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Condition C Instructions for Participant

For this experiment, I will take you to a different room that contains an
eye tracker capable of recording eye movements, blinking, and pupil
dilation. You will be asked to sit in front of an infrared eye scanner and
look at a computer screen with a landscape. Your head will be
positioned on a headstand and rest there during the experiment. You
will be asked to wear a microphone headset, which will allow the
computer to measure your response time in answering questions and
prevent others' from hearing the questions you are being asked. The
data collected in this experiment will be evaluated as possible cues to
truthfulness or deception.
You will be asked to read hypothetical scenarios in which you will adopt
various roles. After each, a series of questions dealing with this scenario
will be posed. While answering, keep your eyes focused on the
landscape. You may look at any part of the landscape, but try not to
look away from the scene. Please answer all questions deceptively,
consistently, and as quickly as possible. Avoid throat clearing and
irrelevant utterances, such as "uh" and "ah." Please remove any items
from your mouth, such as gum or candy, before entering the room. As a
final reminder, please answer all questions ANSWER ALL
QUESTIONS WITH LIES according to the role you are asked to adopt.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CONSISTENT, SO PLEASE MAKE
SURE THAT THE LIES YOU PROVIDE DO NOT CONTRADICT
ONE ANOTHER. All information will be kept strictly confidential and
anonymous.
Prior to testing, you will be given a copy of the questions so you can
rehearse your lies before the questions are being asked. Try to prepare
believable and consistent lies during rehearsal time.
Can you summarize for me in your own words what we want you to do?

APPENDIX H
SET OF INSTRUCTIONS
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SET OF INSTRUCTIONS
A copy of the written instructions will be provided to participants as the greeter
reads aloud. All participants will be asked to summarize instructions in their own words
after hearing them. Misunderstandings will be corrected. After the participants have read
along, they will be allowed to review the written scenarios until they indicate that they
understand their roles.
General Instructions
"In the following experiment, please listen closely to each scenario and then
respond to the following questions with a short answer or yes/no reply depending on what
role you have been assigned. Please listen carefully to each scenario. Do you have any
questions at this point? Are you ready to get started?"
This first scenario is for practice purposes only but reflects the basic features of
the longer experimental scenarios.
Practice Scenario:
Imagine that you did not want to get out of bed this morning, but you were
scheduled to come to this experiment for extra credit for your Psychology
102 class. Please pretend that you decided to stay at home and take the day
off. Your instructor will question you at the beginning of your next class
period, tomorrow, concerning why you blew off the experiment you
signed up for.

Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition:
"You know that you missed the experiment without a good reason (you did not
want to get out of bed) but decide to tell your instructor the truth about not showing up
for the experiment. Please answer the following questions truthfully."
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You know that you do not have a good excuse for missing the experiment but
would like to get the extra credit anyway. You figure that pretending that you were ill
might make your instructor more sympathetic and you might receive the extra credit.
Please answer the following questions by adopting the role (pretending) of having been
too ill to go to the experiment."
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You know that you do NOT have a good excuse for missing the experiment but would
like to get the extra credit anyway. You figure that pretending that you were ill will make
your instructor more sympathetic and you will receive the extra credit. Please answer the
following questions by adopting the role of having been (pretending to be) too ill to go to
the experiment." After the instructions, the participant will receive the following list of
questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the scenario.
Questions Asked in all Three Conditions:
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor. Answer
them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.
1. What were you doing at the time you were scheduled for the experiment?
2. Were you unable to come to the experiment?
3. Were you sick at the time of your appointment for the experiment?

4. If anything, what was your illness?
5. Why didn't you call me?
After successfully completing the practice scenario, the experimental scenarios will be
presented. The order will be randomized.
Scenario 1:
Please adopt the role of a salesperson at a large department store who has
been home on sick pay for the past two weeks after an accident at work.
Specifically, you slipped and hurt your back slightly. It is really time for
you to return to work because your injury has healed completely. You
have experienced no problems in the past few days. You feel great and
suffer from no type of physical pain. You have another appointment with
your physician who will decide whether you should stay at home and use
your sick time or go back to work.
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition:
"Please answer truthfully the following questions about your health condition.
Recall that you are fine and ready to return to work."
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You want to have additional time off by using the three weeks of sick time you
have accumulated during your years of work. You will be given a list of the questions in
a few minutes concerning your health condition. Lie about how you feel. Though you feel
well, please make sure that you will provide convincing lies in order to meet your goal of
getting extra sick time for staying at home. Pretend that your back still hurts and that you
are unable to continue your work at this time."
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Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You want to have additional time off by using the three weeks of sick time you
have accumulated during your years of work. You will be given a list of the questions in
a few minutes concerning your health condition. Lie about how you feel. Though you feel
well, please make sure that you will provide convincing answers in order to meet your
goal of getting extra sick time for staying at home. Pretend that your back still hurts and
that you are unable to continue your work at this time." After the instructions, the
participant will receive the following list of questions for two minutes in order to rehearse
answers to the scenario.
Questions to be Asked in all Three Conditions:
Assume that the questions are being asked by your doctor. Answer them as you
were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.
1. How are you feeling today?
2. Are you suffering from any type of pain?
3. Do you currently experience any problems from the fall at work?
4. How does your back feel right now?
5. Are you able to move around without pain and continue your work?
6. Do you need to stay at home for additional time to heal?
7. Are you ready to return to work?
8. Do you think you would experience any pain if you were to go back to work right
now?
9. How much more time do you think you need in order to heal?
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Scenario 2:
You just missed a major test in your 8:00 AM English 102 Composition
class because you overslept. Your professor, a tough-minded individual,
will only excuse you for genuine illness. Otherwise you will get an "F" for
the missed exam and most likely for the course. It is past the drop date.
Your financial aid and your goal of a high GPA for graduation are at risk
unless you are able to convince your professor that you can make up this
test. You have an appointment in her office at 2:00 PM, hopefully to
convince her to make up the exam.
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition:
"Please answer truthfully the following questions with the hope that being truthful
will surprise the instructor into being sympathetic and lenient with you."
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You need to come up with a compelling lie so that your instructor will let you
retake the exam. Pretend that you were sick and were unable to take the exam but did not
have time to see a doctor for an excuse. The questions you will be asked will concern
your health condition. Be sure to answer with convincing lies in order to meet your goal
of taking a make-up."
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You need to come up with a compelling lie so that your instructor will let you
retake the exam. Pretend that you were sick and unable to take the exam but did not have
time to see a doctor for an excuse. The questions you will be asked will concern your
health condition. Be sure that you will prepare convincing lies in order to meet your goal

of taking a make-up." After the instructions, the participant will receive the following
of questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the scenario.
Questions to be Asked in all Three Conditions:
Assume that the following questions are being asked by your instructor in her
office. Answer them as you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.
1. Did you miss the test for a good reason?
2. What was your reason?
3. Were you sick?
4. Why didn't you call me?
5. What, if any, were the symptoms of your illness?
6. Where were you during the exam?
7. What were you doing?
8. Were you able to come to class on the day of the exam?
Scenario 3:
Approximately six months you suffered from severe depression which
made it impossible for you to work in your dead-end job. Your depression
made you feel weak, tired, and unable to enjoy anything at that time. You
also had problems concentrating and remembering things. Your
depression made it impossible for you to work so you slept all day long.
Your work consists of standing on an assembly line in a chicken plant
every day where you sort the chicken parts into bags of wings and drum
sticks, a really boring and disgusting job. You decided to claim disability
for a chronic depressive disorder at that time but have since fully

recovered and are able to return to work. You have energy and enjoy life
again. The appointment for your disability examination is scheduled today
and you will be asked questions about your psychological condition.
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition:
"Please answer truthfully the following questions about your psychological
condition when the examiner asks you about your bout with depression."
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Condition:
"Although you are completely capable of returning to work you would like to take
advantage of getting money for disability so you do not have to go back to your
disgusting and boring job. In a few minutes, you will be asked questions from the
disability examiner. Please lie about your health condition and pretend that you are still
depressed so you get disability payments. Remember to be as convincing as possible in
your lies."
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition:
"Although you are completely capable of returning to work you would like to take
advantage of getting money for disability so you do not have to go back to your
disgusting and boring job. In a few minutes you will be asked questions from the
disability examiner. Please lie about your health condition and pretend that you are still
depressed so you get disability payments. Remember to be as convincing as possible in
your lies." After the instructions, the participant will receive the following list of
questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the scenario.
Questions to be Asked in all Three Conditions:

Assume that the questions are asked by a disability examiner. Answer them
you were instructed outside and as quickly as possible.
1. Are you suffering from depression at this time?
2. Have you experienced any improvements in your mood lately?
3. How is your energy level now?
4. Do you still have any problems with memory?
5. Are you easily fatigued?
6. How is your concentration?
7. Do you think you can go back to work at this time?
8. Does your depression currently make it difficult to perform your job?
9. Do you feel that you are so sick that you still need disability payments?
Scenario 4:
You drove your 1999 Toyota Corolla three weeks ago on campus when
this big Mercedes came out from a side road in reckless disregard of your
car and your right away. The car hit you, totaled your Corolla, but did not
cause you any physical injuries. Immediately after the accident happened,
the driver of the Mercedes jumped out, yelled at you for not stopping on
time, and did not ask you if you were okay or if you needed help. Later,
you overhead him talking to his wife on his cell phone saying that a
"jackass college kid ran into me." He creates difficulties for you,
requesting his insurance to check your role in the accident very carefully
and not pay for your totaled car. You finally have a court date and the

judge is going to ask you questions about your psychological and physical
well-being resulting from the accident.
Instructions for the Truth Telling Condition:
"Recall that you suffered no physical or psychological injuries from the accident.
Please answer truthfully the following questions about your physical and psychological
condition when the judge asks you."
Instructions for the Unrehearsed Malingering Conditions:
"You are really angry at the arrogant Mercedes driver and would like to get some
extra money (and getting a little payback) from the accident by pretending that you had a
neck injury (whip-lash). You pretend further that you have problems moving your neck
and feel pain during daily activities. Assume that the questions will be asked by the judge
concerning any physical or psychological symptoms due to the accident. Please
remember to be as convincing as possible in your lies in order for the judge to award you
money for your fake pain and injury."
Instructions for the Rehearsed Malingering Condition:
"You are really angry at the arrogant Mercedes driver and would like to get some
extra money (and getting a little payback) from the accident by pretending that you had a
neck injury (whip-lash). You pretend further that you have problems moving your neck
and feel pain during daily activities. Assume that the questions will be asked by the judge
concerning any physical or psychological symptoms due to the accident. Please
remember to be as convincing as possible in your lies in order for the judge to award you
money for your fake pain and injury." After the instructions, the participant will receive

the following list of questions for two minutes in order to rehearse answers to the
scenario.
Questions in all Three Conditions:
Assume that the judge is asking the questions.
1. You were involved in a car accident. What suffering did you have from the
accident?
2. Did you receive any bodily injuries?
3. Did you feel any pain after the accident?
4. What were your bodily injuries?
5. Did you experience any psychological distress?
6. Do you believe that you should receive monetary damages beyond the costs of
replacing your car?
7. Where have you felt pain?
8. How does your neck feel since the accident?
9. Do you have any problems moving your neck?

